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Abstract—Computer systems often provide hardware support
for isolation mechanisms like privilege levels, virtual memory,
or enclaved execution. Over the past years, several successful
software-based side-channel attacks have been developed that
break, or at least significantly weaken the isolation that these
mechanisms offer. Extending a processor with new architectural
or micro-architectural features, brings a risk of introducing new
such side-channel attacks.
This paper studies the problem of extending a processor with
new features without weakening the security of the isolation
mechanisms that the processor offers. We propose to use full
abstraction as a formal criterion for the security of a processor
extension, and we instantiate that criterion to the concrete case
of extending a microprocessor that supports enclaved execution
with secure interruptibility of these enclaves. This is a very
relevant instantiation as several recent papers have shown that
interruptibility of enclaves leads to a variety of software-based
side-channel attacks. We propose a design for interruptible
enclaves, and prove that it satisfies our security criterion. We
also implement the design on an open-source enclave-enabled
microprocessor, and evaluate the cost of our design in terms of
performance and hardware size.
This is the extended version of the paper [1] that includes both
the original paper as well as the technical appendix with the proofs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many computing platforms run programs coming from a
number of different stakeholders that do not necessarily trust
each other. Hence, these platforms provide mechanisms to
prevent code from one stakeholder to interfere with code
from other stakeholders in undesirable ways. These isolation
mechanisms are intended to confine the interactions between
two isolated programs to a well-defined communication inter-
face. Examples of such isolation mechanisms include process
isolation, virtual machine monitors, or enclaved execution [2].
However, security researchers have shown that many of
these isolation mechanisms can be attacked by means of
software-exploitable side-channels. Such side-channels have
been shown to violate integrity of victim programs [3], [4],
[5], as well as their confidentiality on both high-end processors
[6], [7], [8], [9] and on small microprocessors [10]. In fact,
over the past two years, many major isolation mechanisms
have been successfully attacked: Meltdown [7] has broken
user/kernel isolation, Spectre [8] has broken process isolation
and software defined isolation, and Foreshadow [9] has broken
enclaved execution on Intel processors.
The class of software-exploitable side-channel attacks is
complex and varied. These attacks often exploit, or at least
rely on, specific hardware features or hardware implementation
details. Hence, for complex state-of-the-art processors there is
a wide potential attack surface that should be explored (see
for instance [11] for an overview of just the attacks that rely
on transient execution). Moreover, the potential attack vectors
vary with the attacker model that a specific isolation mecha-
nism considers. For instance, enclaved execution is designed
to protect enclaved code from malicious operating system
software whereas process isolation assumes that the operating
system is trusted and not under control of the attacker. As
a consequence, protection against software-exploitable side-
channel attacks is much harder for enclaved execution [12].
Hence, no silver-bullet solutions against this class of attacks
should be expected, and countermeasures will likely be as
varied as the attacks. They will depend on attacker model,
performance versus security trade offs, and on the specific
processor feature that is being exploited.
The objective of this paper is to study how to design
and prove secure such countermeasures. In particular, we
rigorously study the resistance of enclaved execution on small
microprocessors [13], [14] against interrupt-based attacks [10],
[15], [16]. This specific instantiation is important and challeng-
ing. First, interrupt-based attacks are very powerful against
enclaved execution: fine-grained interrupts have been a key
ingredient in many attacks against enclaved execution [17],
[9], [18], [10]. Second, to the best of our knowledge, all
existing implementations of interruptible enclaved execution
are vulnerable to software-exploitable side-channels, including
implementations that specifically aim for secure interruptibility
[19], [14].
We base our study on the existing open-source Sancus
platform [20], [13] that supports non-interruptible enclaved
execution. We illustrate that achieving security is non-trivial
through a variety of attacks enabled by supporting interrupt-
ibility of enclaves. Next, we provide a formal model of the
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existing Sancus and we then extend it with interrupts. We
prove that this extension does not break isolation properties
by instantiating full abstraction [21].
Roughly, we show that what the attacker can learn from
(or do to) an enclave is exactly the same before and after
adding the support for interrupts. In other words, adding
interruptibility does not open new avenues of attack. Finally,
we implement the secure interrupt handling mechanism as
an extension to Sancus, and we show that the cost of the
mechanism is low, in terms of both hardware complexity and
performance.
In summary, the novel contributions of this paper are:
• We propose a specific design for extending Sancus, an
existing enclaved execution system, with interrupts.
• We propose to use full abstraction [21] as a formal
criterion of what it means to maintain the security of iso-
lation mechanisms under processor extensions. Also, we
instantiate it for proving that the mechanism of enclaved
execution, extended to support interrupts, complies with
our security definition.
• We implement the design on the open source Sancus
processor, and evaluate cost in terms of hardware size
and performance impact.1
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II we provide
background information on enclaved execution and interrupt-
based attacks. Section III provides an informal overview of our
approach. Section IV discusses our formalization and sketches
the proof, pointing to the appendices for full details. Then,
in Section V we describe and evaluate our implementation.
Section VI and VII discuss limitations, and the connection to
related work. Finally, Section VIII offers our conclusions and
plans for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
a) Enclaved execution: Enclaved execution is a security
mechanism that enables secure remote computation [22]. It
supports the creation of enclaves that are initialized with
a software module, and that have the following security
properties. First, the software module in the enclave is isolated
from all other software on the same platform, including system
software such as the operating system. Second, the correct
initialization of an enclave can be remotely attested: a remote
party can get cryptographic assurance that an enclave was
properly initialized with a specific software module (charac-
terized by a cryptographic hash of the binary module). These
security properties are guaranteed while relying on a small
trusted computing base, for instance trusting only the hardware
[13], [2], or possibly also a small hypervisor [23], [24].
The remote attestation aspect of enclaved execution is im-
portant for the secure initialization of enclaves, and for setting
up secure communication channels to the enclave. However, it
does not play an important role for the interrupt-driven attacks
that we study in this paper, and hence we will focus here on
1 Our implementation is available online at https://github.com/sancus-pma/
sancus-core/tree/nemesis.
the isolation aspect of enclaves only. Other papers describe in
detail how remote attestation and secure communication work
on large [22] or small systems [13], [14].
The isolation guarantees offered to an enclaved software
module are the following. The module consists of two con-
tiguous memory sections, a code section, initialized with
the machine code of the module, and a data section. The
data section is initialized to zero, and loading of confidential
data happens through a secure channel to the enclave, after
attesting the correct initialization of the module. For instance,
confidential data can be restored from cryptographically sealed
storage, or can be obtained from a remote trusted party.
The enclaved execution platform guarantees that: (1) the
data section of an enclave is only accessible while executing
code from the code section, and (2) the code section can only
be entered through one or more designated entry points.
These isolation guarantees are simple, but they offer the
useful property that data of a module can only be manipulated
by code of the same module, i.e., an encapsulation property
similar to what programming languages offer through classes
and objects. Untrusted code residing in the same address space
as the enclave but outside the enclave code and data sections
can interact with the enclave by jumping to an entry point.
The enclave can return control (and computation results) to
the untrusted code by jumping back out.
b) Interrupt-based attacks: Enclaved execution is de-
signed to be resistant against a very strong attacker that con-
trols all other software on the platform, including privileged
system software. While isolating enclaves is well-understood
at the architectural level, including even successful formal
verification efforts [24], [25], researchers have shown that it is
challenging to protect enclaves against side-channels. Particu-
larly, a recent line of work on controlled channel attacks [12],
[16], [10], [26], [17] has demonstrated a new class of powerful,
low-noise side-channels that leverage the adversary’s increased
control over the untrusted operating system.
A specific consequence of this strong model is that the at-
tacker also controls the scheduling and handling of interrupts:
the attacker can precisely schedule interrupts to arrive during
enclaved execution, and can choose the code to handle these
interrupts. This power has been put to use for instance to
single-step through an enclave [16], or to mount a new class
of ingenious interrupt latency attacks [10], [15] that derive in-
dividual enclaved instruction timings from the time it takes to
dispatch to the untrusted operating system’s interrupt handler.
We provide concrete examples of interrupt-based attacks in the
next section, after detailing our model of enclaved execution.
While advanced CPU features such as virtual memory [12],
[26], [9], branch prediction [17], [18] or caching [27] are
known to leak information on high-end processors, pure
interrupt-based attacks such as interrupt latency measurements
are the only known controlled-channel attack against low-end
enclaved execution platforms lacking these advanced features.
Moreover, they have been shown to be very powerful: e.g., Van
Bulck et al. [10] have shown how to efficiently extract enclave
secrets like passwords or PINs from embedded enclaves.
Some enclaved execution designs avoid the problem of
interrupt-based attacks by completely disabling interrupts dur-
ing enclave execution [13], [25]. This has the important down-
side that system software can no longer guarantee availability:
if an enclaved module goes into an infinite loop, the system
cannot progress. All designs that do support interruptibility of
enclaves [19], [14] are vulnerable to these attacks.
III. OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
We set out to design an interruptible enclaved execution sys-
tem that is provably resistant against interrupt-based attacks.
This section discusses our approach informally, later sections
discuss a formalization with security proofs, and report on
implementation and experimental evaluation.
We base our design on Sancus [13], an existing open-source
enclaved execution system. We first describe our Sancus
model, and discuss how extending Sancus with interrupts leads
to the attacks mentioned in Section II-b. In other words, we
show how extending Sancus with interrupts breaks some of
the isolation guarantees provided by Sancus.
Then, we propose a formal security criterion that defines
what it means for interruptibility to preserve the isolation
properties, and we illustrate that definition with examples.
Finally, we propose a design for an interrupt handling
mechanism that is resistant against the considered attacks and
that satisfies our security definition. Crucial to our design
is the assumption that the timing of individual instructions
is predictable, which is typical of “small” microprocessors,
like Sancus. Although tailored here on a specific architecture
and a specific class of attacks, we expect our approach of
ensuring that the same attacks are possible before and after an
architecture extension to be applicable in other settings too.
A. Sancus model
a) Processor: Sancus is based on the TI MSP430 16-bit
microprocessor [28], with a classic von Neumann architecture
where code and data share the same address space. We
formalize the subset of instructions summarized in Table I that
is rich enough to model all the attacks we care about. We have
a subset of memory-to-register and register-to-memory transfer
instructions; a comparison instruction; an unconditional and a
conditional jump; and basic arithmetic instructions.
b) Memory: Sancus has a byte addressable memory of at
most 64KB, where a finite number of enclaves can be defined.
The bound on the number of enclaves is a parameter set at
processor synthesis time. In our model, we assume that there is
only a single enclave, made of a code section, initialized with
the machine code of the module, and a data section. A data
section is securely provisioned with data by relying on remote
attestation and secure communication, not modeled here as
they play no role in the interrupt-based attacks we care about
in this paper. Instead, our model allows direct initialization of
the data section with confidential enclave data. All the other
memory is unprotected memory, and will be considered to be
under control of the attacker.
Instr. i Meaning Cycles Size
RETI Returns from interrupt. 5 1
NOP No-operation. 1 1
HLT Halt. 1 1
NOT r r← ¬r. (Emulated in MSP430) 2 2
IN r Reads word from the device and puts it in r. 2 1
OUT r Writes word in register r to the device. 2 1
AND r1 r2 r2 ← r1 & r2. 1 1
JMP &r Sets pc to the value in r. 2 1
JZ &r Sets pc to the value in r if bit 0 in sr is set. 2 1
MOV r1 r2 r2 ← r1. 1 1
MOV @r1 r2 Loads in r2 the word in starting in location pointed by r1. 2 1
MOV r1 0(r2) Stores the value of r1 starting at location pointed by r2. 4 2
MOV #w r2 r2 ← w. 2 2
ADD r1 r2 r2 ← r1 + r2. 1 1
SUB r1 r2 r2 ← r1 − r2. 1 1
CMP r1 r2 Zero bit in sr set if r2 − r1 is zero. 1 1
Table I: Summary of the assembly language considered.
Enclaves have a single entry point; the enclave can only be
entered by jumping to the first address of the code section.
Multiple logical entry points can easily be implemented on
top of this single physical entry point. Control flow can leave
the enclave by jumping to any address in unprotected memory.
Obviously, a compiler can implement higher-level abstractions
such as enclave function calls and returns, or out-calls from
the enclave to functions in the untrusted code [13].
Sancus enforces program counter (pc) based memory access
control. If the pc is in unprotected memory, the processor can
not access any memory location within the enclave – the only
way to interact with the enclave is to jump to the entry point. If
the pc is within the code section of the enclave, the processor
can only access the enclave data section for reading/writing
and the enclave code section for execution. This access control
is faithfully rendered in our model, via the predicate MAC
in Table II.
c) I/O devices: Sancus uses memory-mapped I/O to in-
teract with peripherals. One important example of a peripheral
for the attacks we study is a cycle accurate timer, which allows
software to measure time in terms of the number of CPU
cycles. In our model, we include a single very general I/O
device that behaves as a state machine running synchronously
to CPU execution. In particular, it is trivial to instantiate this
general I/O device to a cycle-accurate timer.
Instead of modeling memory-mapped I/O, we introduce two
special instructions that allow writing/reading a word to/from
the device (see Table I). Actually these instructions are short-
hands, which are easy to macro-expand, at the price of dealing
with special cases in the execution semantics for any memory
operation. For instance, software could read the current cycle
timer value from a timer peripheral by using the IN instruction.
The I/O devices can request to interrupt the processor with
single-cycle accuracy. The original Sancus disables interrupts
during enclaved execution. One of the key objectives of this
paper is to propose a Sancus extension that does handle such
interrupts without weakening security. Hence, we will define
two models of Sancus, one that ignores interrupts, and one
that handles them even during enclaved execution.
B. Security definitions
a) Attacker model: An attacker controls the entire con-
text of an enclave, that is: he controls (1) all of unprotected
memory (including code interacting with the enclave, as well
as data in unprotected memory), and (2) the connected device.
This is the standard attacker model for enclaved execution. In
particular, it implies that the attacker has complete control over
the Interrupt Service Routines.
b) Contextual equivalence formalizes isolation: Infor-
mally, our security objective is extending the Sancus processor
without weakening the isolation it provides to enclaves. What
isolation achieves is that attackers can not see “inside” an
enclave, so making it possible to “hide” enclave data or
implementation details from the attacker. We formalize this
concept of isolation precisely by using the notion of con-
textual equivalence or contextual indistinguishability (as first
proposed by Abadi [21]). Two enclaved modules M1 and M2
are contextually equivalent, if the attacker can not distinguish
them, i.e., if there exists no context that tells them apart. We
discuss this on the following example.
Example 1 (Start-to-end timing). The following enclave com-
pares a user-provided password in R15 with a secret in-enclave
password at address pwd_adrs , and stores the user-provided
value in R14 into the enclave location at store_adrs if the user
password was correct.
1 enclave_entry:
2 /* Load addresses for comparison */
3 MOV #store_adrs, r10 ; 2 cycles
4 MOV #access_ok, r11 ; 2 cycles
5 MOV #endif, r12 ; 2 cycles
6 MOV #pwd_adrs, r13 ; 2 cycles
7 /* Compare user vs. enclave password */
8 MOV @r13, r13 ; 2 cycles
9 CMP r13, r15 ; 1 cycle
10 JZ &r11 ; 2 cycles
11 access_fail: /* Password fail: return */
12 JMP &r12 ; 2 cycles
13 access_ok: /* Password ok: store user val */
14 MOV r14, 0(r10) ; 4 cycles
15 endif: /* Clear secret enclave password */
16 SUB r13, r13 ; 1 cycle
17 enclave_exit:
In the absence of a timer device, this enclave successfully
hides the in-enclave password. If we take enclaves M1 and M2
to be two instances of Example 1, differing only in the value
for the secret password, then M1 and M2 are indistinguishable
for any context that does not have access to a cycle accurate
timer: all such a context can do is call the entry point, but the
context does not get any indication whether the user-provided
password was correct. This formalizes that enclave isolation
successfully “hides” the password.
However, with the help of a cycle accurate timer, the
attacker can distinguish M1 and M2 as follows. The attacker
can create a context that measures the start-to-end execution
time of an enclave call: the context reads the timer right before
jumping to the enclave. On enclave exit, the context reads the
timer again to compute the total time spent in the enclave.
In order to reason about execution timing, we repre-
sent enclaved executions as an ordered array of individ-
ual instruction timings. (Table I conveniently specifies how
many cycles it takes to execute each instruction.) Hence the
two possible control flow paths of the above program are:
ok=[2,2,2,2,2,1,2,4,1] for the “access_ok” branch,
or fail=[2,2,2,2,2,1,2,2,1] for the “access_fail”
branch. Since sum(ok) = 18 and sum(fail) = 16, the
context can distinguish the two control flow paths, and hence
can distinguish M1 and M2 (and by launching a brute-force
attack [29], can also extract the secret password).
This example illustrates how contextual equivalence formal-
izes isolation. It also shows that the original Sancus already has
some side-channel vulnerabilities under our attacker model.
Since we assume the attacker can use any I/O device, he can
choose to use a timer device and mount the start-to-end timing
attack we discussed.
It is important to note that it is not our objective in this paper
to close these existing side-channel vulnerabilities in Sancus.
Our objective is to make sure that extending Sancus with
interrupts does not introduce additional side-channels, i.e., that
this does not weaken the isolation properties of Sancus.
For existing side-channels, like the start-to-end timing side-
channel, countermeasures can be applied by the enclave pro-
grammer. For instance, the programmer can balance out the
various secret-dependent control-flow paths as in Example 2.
Example 2 (Interrupt latency). Consider the program of Ex-
ample 1, balanced in terms of overall execution time by adding
two NOP instructions at lines 13-14. The two possible control
flow paths are: ok=[2,2,2,2,2,1,2,4,1] vs. fail=
[2,2,2,2,2,1,2,1,1,2,1]. Since sum(ok) is equal
to sum(fail), the start-to-end timing attack is mitigated.
1 enclave_entry:
2 /* Load addresses for comparison */
3 MOV #store_adrs, r10 ; 2 cycles
4 MOV #access_ok, r11 ; 2 cycles
5 MOV #endif, r12 ; 2 cycles
6 MOV #pwd_adrs, r13 ; 2 cycles
7 /* Compare user vs. enclave password */
8 MOV @r13, r13 ; 2 cycles
9 CMP r13, r15 ; 1 cycle
10 JZ &r11 ; 2 cycles
11 access_fail:
12 /* Password fail: constant time return */
13 NOP ; 1 cycle
14 NOP ; 1 cycle
15 JMP &r12 ; 2 cycles
16 access_ok: /* Password ok: store user val */
17 MOV r14, 0(r10) ; 4 cycles
18 endif: /* Clear secret enclave password */
19 SUB r13, r13 ; 1 cycle
20 enclave_exit:
c) Interrupts can weaken isolation: We now show that
a straightforward implementation of interrupts in the Sancus
processor would significantly weaken isolation. Consider an
implementation of interrupts similar to the TI MSP430: on ar-
rival of an interrupt, the processor first completes the ongoing
instruction, and then jumps to an interrupt service routine.
The program in Example 2 is secure on Sancus without
interrupts. However, it is not secure against a malicious context
that can schedule interrupts to be handled while the enclave
executes. To see why, assume that an interrupt is scheduled by
the malicious context to arrive within the first cycle after the
conditional jump at line 10. If the jump was taken then the
instruction being executed is the 4-cycle MOV at line 18, other-
wise the current instruction is the 1-cycle NOP at line 13. Now,
since the attacker’s interrupt handler will only be called after
completion of the current instruction, the adversary observes
an interrupt latency difference of 3 cycles, depending on the
secret branch condition inside the enclave. Researchers [10]
have shown how interrupt latency can be practically measured
to precisely reconstruct individual enclave instruction timings
on both high-end and low-end enclave processors.
Using this attack technique, a context can again distinguish
two instances of the module with a different password, and
hence the addition of interrupts has weakened isolation.
A strawman solution to fix the above timing leakage is
to modify the implementation of interrupt handling in the
processor to always dispatch interrupt service routines in
constant time T, i.e., regardless of the execution time of the
interrupted instruction. We show in the two examples below,
however, that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
Example 3 (Resume-to-end timing). Consider the program
from Example 2 executed on a processor which always dis-
patches interrupts in constant time T. The attacker schedules
an interrupt to arrive in the first cycle after the JZ instruction,
yielding constant interrupt latency T. Next, the context resumes
the enclave and measures the time it takes to let the enclave
run to completion without further interrupts. While interrupt
latency timing differences are properly masked, the time to
complete enclave execution after resume from the interrupt is
1 cycle for the ok path and 4 cycles for the fail path.
Example 4 (Interrupt-counting attack). An alternative way
to attack the program from Example 2 even when interrupt
latency is constant, is to count how often the enclave execution
can be interrupted, e.g., by scheduling a new interrupt 1 cycle
after resuming from the previous one. Since interrupts are
handled on instruction boundaries, this allows the attacker
to count the number of instructions executed in the enclave,
and hence to distinguish the two possible control flow paths.
d) Defining the security of an extension: The examples
above show how a new processor feature (like interrupts)
can weaken isolation of an existing isolation mechanism (like
enclaved execution), and this is exactly what we want to avoid.
Here we propose and implement a provably secure defense
against these attacks. With this background, our security
definition is now obvious. Given an original system (like
Sancus), and an extension of that system (like interruptible
Sancus), that extension is secure if and only if it does not
change the contextual equivalence of enclaves. Enclaves that
are contextually equivalent in the original system must be
contextually equivalent in the extended system and vice versa
(we shall formalize this as a full abstraction property later on).
C. Secure interruptible Sancus
Designing an interrupt handling mechanism that is secure
according to our definition above is quite subtle. We illustrate
I I’
Interrupt service 
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Figure 1: The secure padding scheme.
some of the subtleties. In particular, we provide an intuition
on how an appropriate use of padding can handle the various
attacks discussed above. We also discuss how other design
aspects are crucial for achieving security. In this section, we
just provide intuition and examples. The ultimate argument
that our design is secure is our proof, discussed later.
a) Padding: We already discussed that it is insufficient
for security to naively pad interrupt latency to make it constant.
We need a padding approach that handles all kinds of attacks,
including the example attacks discussed above.
The following padding scheme works (see Figure 1). Sup-
pose the attacker schedules the interrupt to arrive at ta, during
the execution of instruction I in the enclave. Let ∆t1 be the
time needed to complete execution of I . To make sure the
attacker can not learn anything from the interrupt latency, we
introduce padding for ∆tp1 cycles where ∆tp1 is computed by
the interrupt handling logic such that ∆t1 +∆tp1 is a constant
value T . This value T should be chosen as small as possible
to avoid wasting unnecessary time, but must be larger than
or equal to the maximal instruction cycle time MAX_TIME (to
make sure that no negative padding is required, even when
an interrupt arrives right at the start of an instruction with
the maximal cycle time). This first padding ensures that an
attacker always measures a constant interrupt latency.
But this alone is not enough, as an attacker can now measure
resume-to-end time as in Example 3. Thus, we provide a sec-
ond kind of padding. On return from an interrupt, the interrupt
handling logic will pad again for ∆tp2 cycles, ensuring that
∆tp1 +∆tp2 is again the constant value T (i.e., ∆tp2 = ∆t1).
This makes sure that the resume-to-end time measured by the
attacker does not depend on the instruction being interrupted.
This description of our padding scheme is still incomplete:
it is also important to specify what happens if a new interrupt
arrives while the interrupt handling logic is still performing
padding because of a previous interrupt. This is important to
counter attacks like that of Example 4. We refer to the formal
description for the complete definition.
Intuitively, the property we get is that (1) an attacker can
schedule an interrupt at any time ta during enclave execution,
(2) that interrupt will always be handled with a constant
latency T , (3) the resume-to-end time is always exactly the
time the enclave still would have needed to complete execution
from point ta if it had not been interrupted.
This double padding scheme is a main ingredient of our
secure interrupt handling mechanism, but many other aspects
of the design are important for security. We briefly discuss a
number of other issues that came up during the security proof.
b) Saving execution state on interrupt: When an en-
claved execution is interrupted, the processor state (contents
of the registers) is saved (to allow resuming the execution
once the interrupt is handled) and is cleared (to avoid leaking
confidential register contents to the context). A straightforward
implementation would be to store the processor state on the
enclave stack. However, the proof of our security theorem
showed that storing the processor state in enclave accessible
memory is not secure: consider two enclaved modules that
monitor the content of the memory area where processor state
is saved, and behave differently on observing a change in the
content of this memory area. These modules are contextually
equivalent in the absence of interrupts (as the contents of this
memory area will never change), but become distinguishable in
the presence of interrupts. Hence, our design saves processor
state in a storage area inaccessible to software.
c) No access to unprotected memory from within an
enclave: Most designs of enclaved execution allow an enclave
to access unprotected memory (even if this has already been
criticized for security reasons [30]). However, for a single
core processor, interruptibility significantly weakens contex-
tual equivalence for enclaves that can access unprotected mem-
ory. Consider an enclave M1 that always returns a constant 0,
and an enclave M2 that reads twice from the same unprotected
address and returns the difference of the values read. On a
single-core processor without interrupts, M2 will also always
return 0, and hence is indistinguishable from M1. But an
interrupt scheduled to occur between the two reads from M2
can change the value returned by the second read, and hence
M1 and M2 become distinguishable. Hence, our design forbids
enclaves to access unprotected memory.
For similar reasons, our design forbids an interrupt handler
to reenter the enclave while it has been interrupted, and forbids
the enclave to directly interact with I/O devices.
Finally, we prevent the interrupt enable bit (GIE) in the
status register from being changed by software in the enclave,
as such changes are unobservable in the original Sancus and
they would be observable once interruptibility is added.
While the security proof is a significant amount of effort,
an important benefit of this formalization is that it forced us
to consider all these cases and to think about secure ways of
handling them. We made our design choices to keep model
and proof simple, and these choices may seem restrictive.
Section VI discusses the practical impact of these choices.
IV. FORMALIZATION AND SECURITY PROOFS
We proceed to formally define two Sancus models, one de-
scribing the original, uninterruptible Sancus (SancusH, Sancus-
High) and one describing the secure interruptible Sancus
(SancusL, Sancus-Low).2 The two share most of their struc-
2The high and low terminology is inherited from the field of secure
compilation of high source languages to low target ones. Also, for readability
we hereafter highlight in blue, sans-serif font elements of SancusH, in
red,bold font elements of SancusL and in black those that are in common.
ture and just differ in the way they deal with interrupts.
Given the semantics of SancusH and SancusL, we formally
show that the two versions of Sancus actually provide the
same security guarantees, i.e., the isolation mechanism is not
broken by adding a carefully designed interruptible enclaved
execution. Technically, this is done through the full abstraction
theorem between SancusH and SancusL (Theorem IV.1).
Note that, our theorem guarantees that the same program has
the same security guarantees both in SancusH and SancusL.
Space limitations prevent us from discussing all the details
of our formalization and we refer the reader to the appendices
for all the missing details.
A. Setting up our formal framework
a) Memory and memory layout: The memory is modeled
as a (finite) function mapping 216 locations to bytes b. Given
a memory M, we denote the operation of retrieving the byte
associated to the location l asM(l). On top of that, we define
read and write operations on words (i.e., pairs of bytes) and
we write w = b1b0 to denote that the most significant byte of
a word w is b1 and its least significant byte is b0.
The read operation is standard: it retrieves two consecutive
bytes from a given memory location l (in a little-endian
fashion, as in the MSP430):
M[l] , b1b0 if M(l) = b0 ∧M(l + 1) = b1
We define the write operation as follows
(M[l 7→ b1b0])(l′) ,

b0 if l′ = l
b1 if l′ = l + 1
M(l′) o.w.
Writing b0b1 in location l in M means to build an updated
memory mapping l to b0, l+1 to b1 and unchanged otherwise.
Note that reads and writes to l = 0xFFFF are undefined (l+1
would overflow hence it is undefined). The memory access
control explicitly forbids these accesses (see below). Also, the
write operation deals with unaligned memory accesses (cfr.
case l′ = l + 1). We faithfully model these aspects to prove
that they do not lead to potential attacks.
A memory layout L , 〈ts, te, ds, de, isr〉 describes how
the enclave and the interrupt service routine (ISR) are placed
in memory and is used to check memory accesses during
the execution of each instruction (see below). The protected
code section is denoted by [ts, te), [ds, de) is the protected
data section, and isr is the address of the ISR. The protected
code and data sections do not overlap and the first address
of the protected code section is the single entry point of the
enclave. Finally, we reserve the location 0xFFFE to store the
address of the first instruction to be executed when the CPU
starts or when an exception happens, reflecting the behavior of
MSP430. Thus, 0xFFFE must be outside the enclave sections
and different from isr .
b) Registers: There are sixteen 16-bit registers, three of
which R0, R1, R2 have dedicated functions, whereas the others
are for general use. (R3 is a constant generator in the MSP430,
but we ignore that use in our formalization.) More precisely,
R0 (hereafter denoted as pc) is the program counter and points
to the next instruction to be executed. Instruction accesses are
performed by word and the pc is aligned to even addresses.
The register R1 (sp hereafter) is the stack pointer and is aligned
to even addresses. Since for the time being we do not model
instructions for procedure calls, the only special use of the
stack pointer in our model is to store the state while handling
an interrupt (see below). The register R2 (sr hereafter) is the
status register and contains different pieces of information
encoded as flags. The most important for us is the fourth bit,
called GIE, set to 1 when interrupts are enabled. Other bits
signal, e.g., when an operation produces a carry or when an
operation returns zero.
Formally, our register file R is a function that maps each
register r to a word. While read operation is standard, the write
operation models some invariants enforced by the hardware:
R[r] , w if R(r) = w
R[r 7→ w] , λ[r′].

w&0xFFFE
if r′ = r ∧ (r = pc ∨ r = sp)
(w&0xFFF7) | (R[sr]&0x8)
if r′ = r = sr ∧R[pc] `mode PM
w if r′ = r ∧ (r 6= pc ∧ r 6= sp)
R[r′] o.w.
More specifically, the least-significant bit of the program
counter and of the stack pointer are always masked to 0
(as is also the case in the MSP430), and the GIE bit of the
status register is always masked to its previous value when in
protected mode (i.e., it cannot be changed when the CPU is
running protected code, cf. the discussion in Section III). Note
that in the definition above we use the relation R[pc] `mode m,
for m ∈ {PM, UM} made precise below: roughly it denotes
that the execution is in protected or in unprotected mode (i.e,
execution is within, respectively outside the enclave).
c) I/O Devices: I/O devices are (simplified) deterministic
I/O automata D , 〈∆, δinit, a;D〉 over a common signature A
containing the following actions a (below, w is a word): (i) ,
a silent, internal action; (ii) rd(w), an output action (i.e., read
request from the CPU); (iii) wr(w), an input action (i.e., write
request from the CPU); (iv) int?, an output action indicating
an interrupt is raised. The transition function δ a;D δ′ models
the device in state δ performing action a ∈ A and moving to
state δ′, and δinit is the initial state.
d) Contexts, software modules and whole programs:
We call software module a memory MM containing both
protected data and code sections. A context C is a pair
〈MC ,D〉, where D is a device and MC defines the contents
of all memory locations outside the protected sections of the
layout, thus disjoint from MM . Intuitively, the context is the
part of the whole program that can be manipulated by an
attacker. Given a context C and a software module MM , we
define a whole program as C[MM ] = 〈MC unionmultiMM ,D〉.
e) Instruction set: We consider a subset of the MSP430
instructions plus our I/O instructions; they are in Table I. For
each instruction the table includes its operands, an informal
description of its semantics, its duration and the number of
words it occupies in memory. The durations are used to define
the function cycles(i). In our model, we let MAX_TIME = 6,
because the longest MSP430 instructions take 6 cycles (typ-
ically those for moving words within memory [28], none
of which are displayed in Table I). Instructions are stored
in the memory M. We use the meta-function decode(M, l)
that decodes the contents of the cell(s) starting at location l,
returning an instruction in the table if any and ⊥ otherwise.
f) Configurations: Given an I/O device D, the state of
the Sancus system is described by configurations of the form:
c , 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ∈ C, where
(i) δ is the current state of the I/O device; (ii) t is the
current time of the CPU; (iii) ta is either the arrival time
of the last pending interrupt, or ⊥ if there are none (this
value may persist across multiple instructions); (iv) M is the
current memory; (v) R is the current content of the registers;
(vi) pcold is the value of the program counter before executing
the current instruction; (vii) B is called the backup, is software
inaccessible storage space to save enclave state (registers, the
old program counter and the remaining padding time) while
handling an interrupt raised in protected mode.
The initial configuration for a whole program C[MM ] =
〈M,D〉 is:
INITC[MM ] , 〈δinit, 0,⊥,M,RinitMC , 0xFFFE,⊥〉 where
(i) the state of the I/O device D is δinit; (ii) the initial value of
the clock is 0 and no interrupt has arrived yet; (iii) the memory
is initialized to the whole program memory MC unionmulti MM ;
(iv) all the registers are set to 0 except that pc is set to 0xFFFE
(the address from which the CPU gets the initial program
counter), and that sr is set to 0x8 (the register is clear except
for the GIE flag); (v) the previous program counter is also
initialized to 0xFFFE; (vi) the backup is set to ⊥ to indicate
absence of any backup.
Dually, HALT is the only configuration denoting termi-
nation, more specifically it is an opaque and distinguished
configuration that indicates graceful termination.
Also, we define exception handling configurations, that
model what happens on soft reset of the machine (e.g. on
a memory access violation, or a halt in protected mode). On
such a soft reset, control returns to the attacker by jumping to
the address stored in location 0xFFFE:
EXC〈δ,t,ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉 ,
〈δ, t,⊥,M,R0[pc 7→ M[0xFFFE]], 0xFFFE,⊥〉.
g) I/O device wrapper: Since the class of interrupt-based
attacks requires a cycle-accurate timer, it is convenient to
synchronize the CPU and the device time by forcing the device
tEntry Point Prot. code Prot. Data Other
f
Entry Point/Prot. code r-x r-x rw- –x
Other –x — — rwx
Table II: Definition of MACL(f , rght, t), where f and t are
locations.
to take as many steps as the number of cycles consumed for
each instruction by the CPU. The following “wrapper” around
the device D models this synchronization:
D ` δ, t, ta ykD δ′, t′, t′a
Assuming that the device was in state δ, at time t, and the
last pending interrupt was raised at time ta, then this wrapper
defines for k cycles later: the new time t′ = t+k, the new last
pending interrupt time t′a, and the new device state δ
′. When
no interrupt has to be handled, ta and t′a are ⊥.
h) CPU mode and memory access control: The last two
relations used by the main transition systems are the CPU
mode and the memory access control, MAC. The first tells
when a given program counter value, pc, is an address in the
protected code memory (PM) or in the unprotected one (UM):
pc `mode m, with m ∈ {PM, UM}
(Also, for simplicity, the relation is lifted to configurations.)
The second one
i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK
holds whenever the instruction i can be executed in a CPU
configuration in which the previous program counter is pcold ,
the registers are R and the backup is B. More precisely, it
uses the predicate MACL(f , rght, t) (see Table II) that holds
whenever from the location f we have the rights rght on
location t. The predicate checks that (1) the code we came
from (i.e., that in location pcold ) can actually execute the
instruction i located at R[pc]; (2) i can be executed in current
CPU mode; and (3) we have the rights to perform i from
R[pc], when i is a memory operation.
B. SancusH: a model of the original Sancus
Our models of Sancus are defined by means of two transi-
tion systems: a main one and an auxiliary one. The first system
defines the operational semantics of instructions, and relies on
the auxiliary system to specify the behavior upon interrupts.
a) Main transition system: The main transition system
describes how the SancusH configurations evolve during the
execution, whose steps are represented by transitions of the
following form, where D is an I/O device and c, c′ ∈ C:
D ` c→ c′
Figure 2 reports some selected rules among those defining
the main transition system. The first shows how the model
deals with violations in protected mode: if an instruction can
not be executed according to the memory-access control rela-
tion then a transition to the exception handling configuration
happens. Rule (CPU-MOVL) is for when the current instruction
i loads in r2 the word in memory at the position pointed by
r1. Its first premise checks if the instruction can be executed;
the second one increments the program counter by 2 and
loads in r2 the value M[r1]; the third premise registers in
the device that i requires cycles(i) cycles to complete; and
the last one executes the interrupt logic to check whether an
interrupt needs to be handled or not (see comment below).
Another interesting rule is (CPU-IN) that deals with the case
in which the instruction reads a word from the device and
puts the result in r. Its second premise holds when the device
sends the word w to the CPU; the others are similar to those
of (CPU-MOVL).
b) Interrupt logic: The auxiliary transition system for
SancusH specifies the interrupt logic, and has the form:
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pcold ,B′〉.
Since SancusH ignores all interrupts, even in unprotected
mode, the transition system always leaves the configuration
unchanged.
Actually, one could remove the premise with the auxiliary
transition system from all the rules defining the semantics of
SancusH, as it always holds. However, it is convenient keeping
them both to ease the presentation of the transition system of
SancusL, and for technical reasons, as well.
C. SancusL: secure interruptible Sancus
We now define the semantics of SancusL, the secure
interruptible Sancus, formalizing the mitigation outlined in
Section III. We start by describing the main difference with
that of SancusH, i.e., the way interrupts are handled.
a) Interrupt logic: Figure 3 shows the relevant rules of
the auxiliary transition system describing the interrupt logic
of SancusL. Now interrupts are handled both in unpro-
tected and protected mode, modeled by the rules (INT-UM-P)
and (INT-PM-P), resp. For the first case there is the premise
pcold `mode UM, for the second pcold `mode PM (i.e., the mode
in which the last instruction was executed). Both rules have a
premise requiring that the GIE bit of the status register is set to
1 and that an interrupt is on (ta 6= ⊥). (If this is not the case,
two further rules, not displayed, just leave the configuration
untouched, and keep the value of ta unchanged.) A premise
of (INT-UM-P) concerns registers: the program counter gets the
entry point of the handler; the status register gets 0; and the
top of the stack is moved 4 positions ahead. Accordingly, the
new memoryM′ updates the locations pointed by the relevant
elements of the stack with the current program counter and the
contents of the status register. The last premise specifies that
this interrupt handling takes 6 cycles.
The rule (INT-PM-P) is more interesting. Besides assigning
the entry point of the handler to the program counter, it
computes the padding time for mitigation of interrupt-based
timing attacks and saves the backup in B′. The padding k
is then used, causing interrupt handling to take 6 + k steps.
(CPU-VIOLATION-PM)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad 〉 i,R, pcold ,B 6`mac OK
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → EXC〈δ,t+cycles(i),ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) 6= ⊥
(CPU-MOVL)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad 〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ M[R[r1]]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV @r1 r2
(CPU-IN)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad 〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK δ
rd(w)
; D δ
′ R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r 7→ w]
D ` δ′, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = IN r
Figure 2: Selected rules from the main transition system.
(INT-UM-P)
pcold `mode UM R[sr].GIE = 1
ta 6= ⊥ R′ = R[pc 7→ isr , sr 7→ 0, sp 7→ R[sp]− 4] M′ =M[R[sp]− 2 7→ R[pc],R[sp]− 4 7→ R[sr]] D ` δ, t,⊥y6D δ′, t′, t′a
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pcold ,B〉
(INT-PM-P)
k = MAX_TIME− (t− ta) pcold `mode PM R[sr].GIE = 1 ta 6= ⊥ R′ = R0[pc 7→ isr ] D ` δ, t,⊥y6+kD δ′, t′, t′a B′ = 〈R, pcold , t− ta〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′, t′,⊥,M,R′, pcold ,B′〉
Figure 3: Selected rules for the interrupt logic in SancusL.
Such a padding is needed to implement the first part of
the mitigation (see Section III-C) and is computed so as to
make the dispatching time of interrupts constant. Note that
the padding never gets negative. When an interrupt arrives in
protected mode two cases may arise. Either GIE = 1, and the
padding is non-negative because the interrupt is handled at
the end of the current instruction; or GIE = 0, and no padding
is needed because the interrupt is handled as soon as GIE
becomes 1, which is only possible in unprotected mode. The
backup stores part of the CPU configuration (R and pcold )
and tpad = t − ta. The value of tpad will then be used
as further padding before returning, so fully implementing
the mitigation (cf. Section III-C). The register file R0 is
{pc 7→ 0, sp 7→ 0, sr 7→ 0, R3 7→ 0, . . . , R15 7→ 0}.
b) The main transition system: The rules defining the
main transition system of SancusL are those of SancusH, with
a non-trivial transition system for interrupt logic and mitigation
— this explains why also SancusH rules have the premise
D ` · ↪→I · for interrupts.
There are new rules for the new RETI instruction, shown
in Figure 4. Rule (CPU-RETI) deals with a return from an
interrupt that was handled in unprotected mode, i.e., when
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI and there is no backup. Its
first premise checks that the RETI instruction is indeed per-
mitted. The second one requires that the program counter is set
to the contents of the memory location pointed by the second
element from the top of the stack (that grows downwards); that
the status register is set to the contents of the memory location
pointed by the top of the stack; and that two words are popped
from the stack. Finally, the third one registers that cycles(i)
steps are needed to complete this task. Rule (CPU-RETI-CHAIN)
executes the interrupt handler in unprotected mode when the
CPU discovers that another interrupt arrived, while returning
from a handler whose interrupt was raised in protected mode
(via the interrupt logic). The most interesting rules are the
last two. They deal with the case in which the CPU is
returning from the handling of an interrupt raised in protected
mode, but no new interrupt arrived afterwards (or the GIE
bit is off, cf. fourth premise of rule (CPU-RETI-PREPAD)).
First, rule (CPU-RETI-PREPAD) restores registers and pcold from
the backup B, then rule (CPU-RETI-PAD) (which is the only
one applicable after (CPU-RETI-PREPAD)) applies the remaining
padding (recorded in the backup) to rule out resume-to-end
timing attacks (note that this last padding is interruptible, as
witnessed by the last premise). We model the mechanism
of restoring registers, pcold and of applying the remaining
padding with two rules instead of just one for technical
reasons (see the appendices for details). Note that this last
padding is applied even if the configuration reached through
rule (CPU-RETI-PREPAD) is in unprotected mode (i.e., the
interrupted instruction was a jump out of protected mode).
Indeed, if it was not the case, the attacker would be able to
discover the value of the padding applied before the interrupt
service routine.
(CPU-RETI)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad 〉 i,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK
R′ = R[pc 7→ M[R[sp] + 2], sr 7→ M[R[sp]], sp 7→ R[sp] + 4] D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉 → 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],⊥〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-RETI-CHAIN)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad 〉 B 6= ⊥ D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a
R[sr.GIE] = 1 t′a 6= ⊥ D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′,R[pc],B〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′,R[pc],B〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-RETI-PREPAD)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad 〉
i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK B 6= ⊥ D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a (R[sr.GIE] = 0 ∨ t′a = ⊥)
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,B.R,B.pcold , 〈⊥,⊥,B.tpad 〉〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-RETI-PAD)
B = 〈⊥,⊥, tpad 〉 D ` δ, t, ta ytpadD δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M,R′, pcold ,B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M,R′, pcold ,B′〉
Figure 4: Some rules from the operational semantics of SancusL.
D. Security theorem
Our security theorem states that what an attacker can learn
from an enclave is exactly the same before and after adding the
support for interrupts. Technically, we show that the semantics
of SancusL is fully abstract w.r.t. the semantics of SancusH,
i.e., all the attacks that can be carried out in SancusL can
also be carried out in SancusH, and viceversa. Even though
the technical details are specific to our case study, the security
definition applies also to other architectures. Before stating the
full abstraction theorem and giving the sketch of its proof, we
introduce some further notations.
Recall that a whole program C[MM ] consists of a module
MM and a context C = 〈MC ,D〉, where MC contains the
unprotected program and data and D is the I/O device.
Let C[MM ]⇓H denote a converging computation in
SancusH, i.e., a sequence of transitions of the whole program
that reaches the halting configuration from the initial one.
Also, let two software modules MM and MM ′ be contex-
tually equivalent in SancusH, written MM 'H MM ′ , if and
only if for all contexts C, C[MM ]⇓H ⇐⇒ C[MM ′ ]⇓H.
Similarly, we define C[MM ]⇓L and MM 'L MM ′ for
SancusL. Roughly, the notion of contextual equivalence
formalizes the intuitive notion of indistinguishability: two
modules are contextually equivalent if they behave in the same
way under any attacker (i.e., context). Due to the quantification
over all contexts, it suffices to consider just terminating and
non-terminating executions as distinguishable, since any other
distinction can be reduced to it. We can state the theorem that
guarantees the absence of interrupt-based attacks:
Theorem IV.1 (Full abstraction).
∀MM ,MM ′ . (MM 'HMM ′ ⇐⇒ MM 'LMM ′).
First we prove MM 'L MM ′ ⇒ MM 'H MM ′ and then
MM 'HMM ′ ⇒MM 'LMM ′ . Below we only intuitively
describe the proof steps (all the details are in the appendices).
a) Proof sketch for MM 'L MM ′ ⇒MM 'H MM ′ :
Since programs in SancusH behave like those in SancusL
with no interrupts, proving this implication is not too hard. It
suffices to introduce the notion of interrupt-less context C6 I for
SancusL that behaves as C, but never raises interrupts. The
thesis follows because an enclave hosted in a interrupt-less
context terminates in SancusL whenever it does in SancusH,
as interrupt-less contexts are a strict subset of all the contexts.
b) Proof sketch for MM 'H MM ′ ⇒MM 'L MM ′ :
We first introduce the notion of observable behavior, in terms
of the traces that C[MM ] can perform according to the
SancusL semantics. Traces are built using three observables:
(i) • denotes that the computation halts; (ii) jmpIn?(R)
denotes that the CPU enters the protected mode, where R are
the observed registers and (iii) jmpOut!(∆t;R) denotes the
exit from protected mode with observed registers R and with
∆t representing the end-to-end time measured by an attacker
for code running in protected mode.
The proof then follows the steps in Figure 5, whereMM T=
MM ′ means that MM and MM ′ have the same traces.
Implication (i) shows that the attacker in SancusL at most
observes as much as traces say; implication (ii) shows that
the attacker in SancusH is at least as powerful as described
by traces; finally implication (iii) is our thesis that follows by
transitivity. The proof of (i)MM T=MM ′ ⇒MM 'LMM ′
roughly goes as follows. First the mitigation is shown to
guarantee that the behavior of the context (in unprotected
mode) does not depend on the behavior of the enclave (in
protected mode) and vice versa (Appendix III, Lemmata III.4
and III.5). The thesis follows because if MM T= MM ′ and
C[MM ] has a trace β, then also C[M′M ] has the same trace
β.
The proof of (ii) MM 'H MM ′ ⇒ MM T= MM ′
MM 'HMM ′
MM 'LMM ′ MM T=MM ′
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Figure 5: The steps for proving preservation of behavior.
is by contraposition: if two modules have different traces,
there exists a context that distinguishes them, and we build
such a context through a backtranslation. Because of the
strong limitations – for instance because only 64KB of mem-
ory is available – building such a context in unprotected
memory only is infeasible and the strong attacker model
that enclaved execution is built for is actually helpful here.
The backtranslation defines and uses both the unprotected
memory (Appendix III, Algorithm 1), and the I/O device,
which has unrestricted memory (Appendix III, Algorithm 2).
Very roughly, the idea is to take a trace of MM and one
of MM ′ that differ for one observable, and build a context C
such thatMM converges andMM ′ does not, so contradicting
the hypothesis MM 'HMM ′ .
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We provide a full implementation of our approach based
on the Sancus [13] architecture which, in turn, is based on
the openMSP430, an open source implementation of the TI
MSP430 ISA. Our implementation can be divided in two parts.
First, we adapted the execution unit’s state machine to add
padding cycles whenever an interrupt happens in protected
mode and when we return from such interrupts. Second, we
added a protected storage area corresponding to B.
a) Cycle padding: To implement cycle padding, we
added three counters to the processor’s frontend. The first,
Creti_nxt, tracks the number of cycles to be padded on the
next RETI. Whenever an interrupt request (IRQ) occurs, this
counter is initialized to zero and is subsequently incremented
every cycle until the current instruction completes. Thus, at
the end of an instruction, this counter holds t − ta, which
corresponds to tpad in B (cf. the (INT-PM-P) rule in Figure 3).
The second counter, Cirq, holds the number of cycles that
needs to be padded when an IRQ occurs. It is initialized to
MAX_TIME − Creti_next (MAX_TIME is 6 in our case) when the
instruction during which an IRQ occurred finishes execution.
That is, it holds the value k from rule (INT-PM-P) in Figure 3
after the instruction finishes. From this point on, the counter is
decremented every cycle and the execution unit’s state machine
is kept in a wait state until the counter reaches zero. Only then
is it allowed to progress and start handling the IRQ.
Lastly, a third counter, Creti, is added that holds the number
of cycles that needs to be padded for the current RETI
instruction. Whenever a RETI is executed while handling an
IRQ from protected mode, this counter is initialized with the
value of Creti_nxt. Then, after restoring the processor state
from B (see Section V-b), this counter is decremented every
cycle until it reaches zero. After these padding cycles, the
next instruction is fetched, from R[pc] restored from B, and
executed. Note that these padding cycles behave as any tpad -
cycle instruction from the perspective of the padding logic.
That is, they can be interrupted and, hence, padded as well.
This is the reason why we need two counters to hold padding
information for RETI: Creti is used to pad the current RETI
instruction and Creti_nxt is used – concurrently, if an IRQ
occurs – to count tpad for the next RETI.
b) Saving and restoring processor state: Whenever an
IRQ in protected mode occurs, the processor’s register state
needs to be saved in a location inaccessible from software.
Our current implementation uses a shadow register file to this
end. We duplicate all registers R0, . . . , R15 (except R3, the
constant generator, which does not store state). On an IRQ,
all registers are first copied to the shadow register file and
then cleared. When a subsequent RETI is executed, registers
are restored from their copies. For the other values in B,
pcold is handled the same as registers, and tpad is saved from
Creti_nxt and restored to Creti, as explained in Section V-a.
Besides the values in B, we add a single bit to indicate
if we are currently handling an IRQ from protected mode,
allowing us to test if B 6= ⊥.
The current implementation allows to save or restore the
processor state in a single cycle at the cost of approximately
doubling the size of the register file. If this increase in area is
unacceptable, the state could be stored in a protected memory
area. Implementing this directly in hardware would increase
the number of cycles needed to save and restore a state to one
cycle per register. Of course, one should make sure that this
memory area is inaccessible from software by adapting the
memory access control logic of the processor accordingly.
c) Evaluation: To evaluate the performance impact of
our implementation, we only need to quantify the overhead
on handling interrupts and returning from them, as an unin-
terrupted flow of instructions is not impacted by our design.
When an IRQ occurs, as well as when the subsequent RETI
is executed, there is a maximum of MAX_TIME padding cycles
executed. This variable part of the overhead is thus bounded
by MAX_TIME cycles for both cases. The fixed part – saving and
restoring the processor’s state – turns out to be 0 in our current
implementation: since the fetch unit’s state machine needs at
least one extra cycle to do a jump in both cases, copying the
state is done during this cycle and causes no extra overhead. Of
course, if the register state is stored in memory, as described
in Section V-b, the fixed overhead grows accordingly.
To evaluate the impact on area, we synthesized our imple-
mentation on a Xilinx XC6SLX25 Spartan-6 FPGA with a
speed grade of −2 using Xilinx ISE Design Suite optimiz-
ing for area. The baseline is an unaltered Sancus 2.0 core
configured with support for a single protected module and 64-
bit keys for remote attestation. The unaltered core could be
synthesized using 1239 slice registers and 2712 slice LUTs.
Adding support for saving and restoring the processor state
increases the area to 1488 slice registers and 2849 slice LUTs
and the implementation of cycle padding further increases it
to 1499 slice registers and 2854 slice LUTs. It is clear that the
largest part of the overhead comes from saving the processor
state which is necessary for any implementation of secure
interrupts and can be optimized as discussed in Section V-b.
The implementation of cycle padding, on the other hand, does
not have a significant impact on the processor’s area.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. On the use of full abstraction a security objective
The security guarantee that our approach offers is quite
strong: an attack is possible in SancusH if and only if it is
possible at SancusL. Full abstraction fits naturally with our
goal, because isolation is defined in terms of contextual equiva-
lence, and full abstraction specifies that contextual equivalence
is preserved and reflected.
The if -part, namely preservation, guarantees that extend-
ing SancusH with interrupts opens no new vulnerabilities.
Reflection, i.e., the only if -part is needed because otherwise
two enclaves that are distinguishable in SancusH become
indistinguishable in SancusL. Although this mainly concerns
functionality and not security, a problem emerges: adding in-
terrupts is not fully “backwards compatible.” Indeed, reflection
rules out mechanisms that while closing the interrupt side-
channels also close other channels. We believe the situation
is very similar for other extensions: adding caches, pipelining,
etc. should not strengthen existing isolation mechanisms either.
Actually, full abstraction enables us to take the security
guarantees of SancusH as the specification of the isolation
required after an extension is added.
An alternative approach to full abstraction would be to
require (a non interactive version of) robust preservation of
timing-sensitive non-interference [31]. This can also guarantee
resistance against the example attacks in Section III. However,
this approach offers a strictly weaker guarantee: our full ab-
straction result implies that timing-sensitive non-interference
properties of SancusH programs are preserved in SancusL,
as far as non-interference takes as secret the whole enclave,
i.e., its memory and code, and the initial state, as well. In
addition, full abstraction implies that isolation properties that
rely on code confidentiality are preserved, and this matters
for enclave systems that guarantee code confidentiality, like
the Soteria system [32]. An advantage however might be that
robust preservation of timing-sensitive non-interference might
be easier to prove.
In case full abstraction is considered too strong as a security
criterion, it is possible to selectively weaken it by modifying
SancusH. For instance, to specify that code confidentiality is
not important, one can modify SancusH to allow contexts to
read the code of an enclave.
B. The impact of our simplifcations
The model and implementation we discussed in this paper
make several simplifying assumptions. A first important obser-
vation that we want to make is that some simplifications of our
model with respect to our implementation are straightforward
to remove. For instance, supporting more MSP430 instructions
in our model would not affect the strong security guarantees
offered by our approach, and only requires straightforward,
yet tedious technical work.
However, there are also other assumptions that are more
essential, and removing these would require additional re-
search. Here, we discuss the impact of these assumptions on
the applicability of our results to real systems.
First, we scoped our work to only consider “small” micro-
processors. The essential assumption our work relies on is that
the timing of individual instructions is predictable (as shown,
e.g., in Table I for the MSP430). This is typically only true
of small microprocessors. As soon as a processor implements
performance enhancing features like caching or speculation,
the timing of an individual instruction will be variable, e.g., a
load will be faster if can be served from the cache. Our model
and proof do not apply to such more advanced processors.
However, we do believe that the padding countermeasure that
we proved to be secure on simple processors is a very good
heuristic countermeasure, also for more advanced processors.
It has been shown that for instance interrupt-latency attacks
are relevant for modern Intel Core processors supporting SGX
enclaves [10]. Interrupt latency is not deterministic on these
processors, but is instead a complex function of the micro-
architectural state at the point of interruption, and it is hard
to determine an upper bound on the maximal latency that
could be observed. Still, padding to a fixed length on interrupt
and complementary padding on resume will significantly raise
the bar for interrupt latency attacks. We are aware that it
would be very hard, if not impossible at all, to carry over
to these settings the strong security guarantees offered by
full abstraction for “small” microprocessors. Consider for
instance the leaks made possible by the persistent micro-
architectural state that we do not model in this paper. However,
implementing our countermeasure will likely make attacks
harder also in high-end microprocessors.
Second, our model made some simplifying assumptions
about the enclave-based isolation mechanism. We did not
model support for cryptographic operations and for attestation.
This means that we assume that the loading and initialization
of an enclave can be done as securely in SancusL as it can
be done in SancusH. Our choice separates concerns, and it is
independent of the security criterion adopted. Modelling both
memory access control and cryptography would only increase
the complexity of the model, as two security mechanisms
rather than one would be in order. Also their interactions
should be considered to prevent, e.g., leaks of cryptographic
keys unveiling secrets protected by memory access control,
and viceversa. Also, we assumed the simple setting where only
a single enclave is supported. We believe these simplifications
are acceptable, as they reduce the complexity of the model
significantly, and as none of the known interrupt-driven attacks
relies on these features. It is also important to emphasize that
these are model-limitations, and that an implementation can
easily support attestation and multiple enclaves. However, for
implementations that do this, our current proof does not rule
out the presence of attacks that rely on these features.
A more fundamental limitation of the model is that it forbids
reentering an enclave that has been interrupted, via `mac .
Allowing reentrancy essentially causes the same complications
as allowing multi-threaded enclaves, and these are substantial
complications that also lead to new kinds of attacks [33]. We
leave investigation of these issues to future work.
Third, our model and implementation make other simplifi-
cations that we believe to be non-essential and that could be
removed with additional work but without providing important
new insights. For instance, we assumed that enclaves have
no read/write access to untrusted memory. A straightforward
alternative is to allow these accesses, but to also make them
observable to the untrusted context in SancusH. Essentially,
this alternative forces the enclave developer to be aware of
the fact that accessing untrusted memory is an interaction
with the attacker. A better alternative (putting less security
responsibility with the enclave developer) is to rely on a trusted
run-time that can access unprotected memory to copy in/out
parameters and results, and then turn off access to unprotected
memory before calling enclaved code. This is very similar to
how Supervisor Mode Access Prevention prevents the kernel
from the security risks of accessing user memory. Our model
could easily be extended to model such a trusted run-time by
considering memory copied in/out as a large CPU register. It
is important to emphasize however that the implementation of
such trusted enclave runtime environments has been shown to
be error-prone [34].
Another such non-essential limitation is the fact that we
do not support nested interrupts, or interrupt priority. It is
straightforward to extend our model with the possibility of
multiple pending interrupts and a policy to select which of
these pending interrupts to handle. One only has to take care
that the interrupt arrival time used to compute padding is the
arrival time of the interrupt that will be handled first.
In summary, to provide hard mathematical security guar-
antees, one often abstracts from some details and provable
security only provides assurance to the extent that the assump-
tions made are valid and the simplifications non-essential. The
discussion above shows that this is the case for a relevant class
of attacks and systems, and hence that our countermeasure
for these attacks is well-designed. Since there is no 100%
security, attacks remain possible for more complex systems
(e.g. including caches and speculation), or for more powerful
attackers (e.g. with physical access to the system).
VII. RELATED WORK
Our work is motivated by the recent wave of software-based
side-channel attacks and controlled-channel attacks that rely
on architectural or micro-architectural processor features. The
area is too large to survey here, but good recent surveys include
Ge et al. [6] for timing attacks, Gruss’ PhD thesis [35] for
software-based microarchitectural attacks before Spectre/Melt-
down, and [11] for transient execution based attacks. The
attacks most relevant to this paper are the pure interrupt-based
attacks. Van Bulck et al. [10] were the first to show how just
measuring interrupt latency can be a powerful attack vector
against both high-end enclaved execution systems like Intel
SGX, and against low-end systems like the Sancus system that
we based our work on. Independently, He et al. [15] developed
a similar attack for Intel SGX.
There is an extensive body of work on defenses against
software-based side-channel attacks. The three surveys men-
tioned above ([6], [35], [11]) also survey defenses, including
both software-based defenses like the constant-time program-
ming model and hardware-based defenses such as cache-
partitioning. To the best of our knowledge, our work proposes
the first defense specifically designed and proved to protect
against pure interrupt-based side-channel attacks. De Clerck
et al. [19] have proposed a design for secure interruptibility
of enclaved execution, but they have not considered side-
channels – their main concern is to make sure that there are
no direct leaks of, e.g., register contents on interrupts. Most
closely related to ours is the work on SecVerilog [36] that also
aims for formal assurances. To guarantee timing-sensitive non-
interference properties, SecVerilog uses a security-typed hard-
ware description language. However, this approach has not yet
been applied to the issue of interrupt-based attacks. Similarly,
Zagieboylo et al. [37] describe an ISA with information-flow
labels and use it to guarantee timing-insensitive information
flow at the architectural level.
An alternative approach to interruptible secure remote com-
putation is pursued by VRASED [25]. In contrast to enclaved
execution, their design only relies on memory access control
for the attestation key, not for the software modules being at-
tested. They prove that a carefully designed hardware/software
co-design can securely do remote attestation.
Our security criterion is directly influenced by a long line of
work that considers full abstraction as a criterion for secure
compilation. The idea was first coined by Abadi [21], and
has been applied in many settings, including compilation to
JavaScript [38], various intermediate compiler passes [39],
[40], and compilation to platforms that support enclaved
execution [41], [42], [43]. But none of these works consider
timing-sensitivity or interrupts: they study compilations higher
up the software stack than what we consider in this paper.
Patrignani et al. [44] have provided a good survey of this
entire line of work on secure compilation.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed an approach to formally assure that
extending a microprocessor with a new feature does not
weaken the isolation mechanisms that the processor offers.
We have shown that the approach is applicable to an IoT-
scale microprocessor, by showing how to design interruptible
enclaved execution that is as secure as uninterruptible enclaved
execution. Despite this successful case study, some limitations
of the approach remain, and we plan to address them in future.
First, as discussed in Section VI, our approach currently ap-
plies only to “small” micro-processors for which we can define
a cycle-accurate operational semantics. While this obviously
makes it possible to rigorously reason about timing-based side-
channels, it is also difficult to scale to larger processors. To
handle larger processors, we need models that can abstract
away many details of the processor implementation, yet keep-
ing enough detail to model relevant micro-architectural attacks.
A very recent and promising example of such a model was
proposed by Disselkoen et al. [45]. An interesting avenue
for future work is to consider such models for our approach
instead of the cycle-accurate models.
Second, the security criterion we proposed is binary: an
extension is either secure, or it is not. The criterion does not
distinguish low bandwidth side-channels from high-bandwidth
side-channels. An important challenge for future work is to
introduce some kind of quantification of the weakening of
security, so that it becomes feasible to allow the introduction
of some bounded amount of leakage.
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APPENDIX I
COMMON DEFINITIONS FOR SancusH AND SancusL
A. Memory and memory layout
The memory is modeled as a (finite) function mapping 216 locations to bytes b (just like in the original Sancus); Given a
memory M, we denote the operation of retrieving the byte associated to the location l as M(l).
On top of that, and for simplicity, we define read and write operations that work on words (i.e., pair of bytes) and we write
w = b1b0 to denote that the most significant byte of a word w is b1 and its least significant byte is b0.
The read operation is standard, except that it retrieves two consecutive bytes from a given memory location l (in a little-endian
fashion, as in the MSP430):
M[l] , b1b0 if M(l) = b0 ∧M(l + 1) = b1
The write operation is more complex because it deals with unaligned memory accesses. We faithfully model detailed aspects
of Sancus, like unaligned accesses, because we want to prove that these detailed aspects do not lead to potential attacks.
(M[l 7→ b1b0])(l′) ,

b0 if l′ = l
b1 if l′ = l + 1
M(l′) o.w.
Indeed writing b0b1 in location l in M means to build an updated memory that maps l to b0, l + 1 to b1 and is unchanged
otherwise.
Note that reads and writes to l = 0xFFFF are undefined operations (l+1 would overflow hence it is undefined). The memory
access control relation explicitly forbids these accesses (see below).
Since modeling the memory as a function gives no clues on how the enclave is organized, we assume a fixed memory
layout L throughout the whole formalization that describes how the enclave is laid out in memory. The protected code and the
protected data are placed in consecutive, non-overlapping memory sections. The memory layout L is used to regulate how the
protected data are accessed: actually, it permits only protected code to manipulate protected data, and to jump to a protected
address and to execute the instruction stored therein. The first address of the protected code section also works as the entry
point of the software module. Note that memory operations enforce no memory access control w.r.t. L, since these checks are
performed during the execution of each instruction (see below). In addition, the memory layout defines the entry point isr of
the interrupt service routine, out of the protected sections. Also, we assume the location 0xFFFE to be reserved to store the
address of the first instruction to be executed when the CPU starts. Formally, a memory layout is defined as
L , 〈ts, te, ds, de, isr〉
where:
• [ts, te) is the protected code section
• [ds, de) is the protected data section
• isr is the entry point for the ISR
Also, we assume that:
• 0xFFFE 6∈ [ts, te) ∪ [ds, de)
• [ts, te) ∩ [ds, de) = ∅
• isr 6∈ [ts, te) ∪ [ds, de)
B. Register files
SancusH, just like the original Sancus, has sixteen 16-bit registers three of which R0, R1, R2 are used for dedicated functions,
whereas the others are for general use. (R3 is a constant generator in the real machine, but we ignore that use in our
formalization.) More precisely, R0 (hereafter denoted as pc) is the program counter and points to the next instruction to
be executed. Instruction accesses are performed by word and the pc is aligned to even addresses. The register R1 (sp hereafter)
is the stack pointer and it is used, as usual, by the CPU to store the pointer to the activation record of the current procedure.
Also the stack pointer is aligned to even addresses. The register R2 (sr hereafter) is the status register and contains different
pieces of information encoded as flags. For example, the fourth bit, called GIE, is set to 1 when interrupts are enabled. Other
bits are set, e.g., when an operation produces a carry or when the result of an operation is zero.
Formally, our register file R is a function that maps each register r to a word. The read operation is standard:
R[r] , w if R(r) = w
Instead, the write operation requires accommodating the hardware itself and our security requirements (see Section III in
the paper for motivation and intuition):
R[r 7→ w] , λ[r′].

w&0xFFFE if r′ = r ∧ (r = pc ∨ r = sp)
(w&0xFFF7) | (R[sr]&0x8) if r′ = r = sr ∧R[pc] `mode PM
w if r′ = r ∧ (r 6= pc ∧ r 6= sp)
R[r′] o.w.
In the definition above we use the relation R[pc] `mode m, for m ∈ {PM, UM} that is defined in subsection I-G. It indicates that
the execution is carried on in protected or in unprotected mode. Note that the least-significant bit of the program counter and
of the stack pointer are always masked to 0 (as it happens in MSP430), and that the GIE bit of the status register is always
masked to its previous value when in protected mode (i.e., it cannot be changed when the CPU is running protected code).
1) Special register files: We define the following special register files:
R0 , {pc 7→ 0, sp 7→ 0, sr 7→ 0, R3 7→ 0, . . . , R15 7→ 0}
RinitM , {pc 7→ M[0xFFFE], sp 7→ 0, sr 7→ 0x8, R3 7→ 0, . . . , R15 7→ 0}
where
• pc is set to M[0xFFFE] as it does in the MSP430
• sp is set to 0 and we expect untrusted code to set it up in a setup phase, if any
• sr is set to 0x8, i.e., register is clear except for the GIE flag
C. I/O Devices
We formalize Sancus I/O devices as (simplified) deterministic I/O automata D , 〈∆, δinit, a;D〉 over a common signature
A:
• A includes the following actions (below w is a word):
– , a silent, internal action;
– rd(w), an output action (i.e., read request from the CPU);
– wr(w), an input action (i.e., write request from the CPU);
– int? an output action telling that an interrupt was raised in the last state.
• ∅ 6= ∆ is the finite set of internal states of the device
• δinit ∈ ∆ is the single initial state
• δ a;D δ′ ⊆ ∆ × A × ∆ is the transition function that takes one step in the device while doing action a ∈ A, starting
in state δ and ending in state δ′. (We write a for a string of actions and we omit  when unnecessary.) The transition
function is such that ∀δ either δ ;D δ′ or δ int?; D δ′′ (i.e., one and only one of the two transitions must be possible),
also at most one rd(w) action must be possible starting from a given state.
Note: to keep the presentation simple we assume to have a special state which is the destination of any action not explicitly
defined.
D. Contexts, software modules and whole programs
Definition I.1. We call software module a memory MM containing both protected data and code sections.
Intuitively, the context is the part of the whole program that can be manipulated by an attacker:
Definition I.2. A context C is a pair 〈MC ,D〉, where D is a device and MC defines the contents of all memory locations
outside the protected sections of the layout.
Definition I.3. Given a context C = 〈MC ,D〉 and a software module MM such that dom (MC) ∩ dom (MM ) = ∅, a whole
program is
C[MM ] , 〈MC unionmultiMM ,D〉.
E. Instruction set
The instruction set Inst 3 i is the same for both SancusL and SancusH and is (almost) that of the MSP430. An overview of
the instruction set is in Table III. For each instruction the table includes its operands, an intuitive meaning of its semantics, its
duration and the number of words it occupies in memory. The durations are used to define the function cycles(i) and implicitly
determine a value MAX_TIME, greater than or equal to the duration of longest instruction. Here we choose MAX_TIME = 6, in
order to maintain the compatibility with the real MSP430 (whose longest instruction takes 6 cycles). Since instructions are
stored in either the unprotected or in the protected code section of the memory M, for getting them we use the meta-function
Instr. i Meaning Cycles Size
RETI Returns from interrupt. 5 1
NOP No-operation. 1 1
HLT Halt. 1 1
NOT r r← ¬r. (Emulated in MSP430) 2 2
IN r Reads word from the device and puts it in r. 2 1
OUT r Writes word in register r to the device. 2 1
AND r1 r2 r2 ← r1 & r2. 1 1
JMP &r Sets pc to the value in r. 2 1
JZ &r Sets pc to the value in r if bit 0 in sr is set. 2 1
MOV r1 r2 r2 ← r1. 1 1
MOV @r1 r2 Loads in r2 the word in starting in location pointed by r1. 2 1
MOV r1 0(r2) Stores the value of r1 starting at location pointed by r2. 4 2
MOV #w r2 r2 ← w. 2 2
ADD r1 r2 r2 ← r1 + r2. 1 1
SUB r1 r2 r2 ← r1 − r2. 1 1
CMP r1 r2 Zero bit in sr set if r2 − r1 is zero. 1 1
Table III: Summary of the assembly language considered.
decode(M, l) that decodes the contents of the cell(s) starting at location l, returning an instruction in the table if any and ⊥
otherwise.
F. Configurations
Given an I/O device D, the internal state of the CPU is described by configurations of the form:
c , 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ∈ C, where
• δ is the current state of the I/O device;
• t is the current time of the CPU;
• ta is either the arrival time of the last pending interrupt, or ⊥ if there are none;
• M is the current memory;
• R is the current content of the registers;
• pcold is the value of the program counter before executing the current instruction
• B is called the backup and can assume different values:
– ⊥, indicating either that the CPU is not handling an interrupt or it is handling one originated in unprotected mode
interrupt
– 〈R, pcold , tpad〉, refers to the case in which an interrupt handler whose interrupt originated in protected mode is being
executed. The triple includes the register file and the old program counter at the time the interrupt originated and the
value tpad , which indicates the remaining padding time that must be applied before returning into protected mode.
The initial states of the CPU are represented by the initial configurations from which the computation starts. The initial
configuration for a whole program C[MM ] = 〈M,D〉 is:
INITC[MM ] , 〈δinit, 0,⊥,M,RinitMC , 0xFFFE,⊥〉 where
• the state of the I/O device D is δinit;
• the initial value of the clock is 0 and no interrupt has arrived yet;
• the memory is initialized to the whole program memory MC unionmultiMM ;
• registers are initialized to their initial values, i.e., all the registers are set to 0 except that pc is set to 0xFFFE (the address
from which the CPU gets the initial program counter), i.e., pc = M[0xFFFE] (as in Sancus), and that sr is set to 0x8
(the register is clear except for the GIE flag);
• the previous program counter is also initialized to 0xFFFE;
• the backup is set to ⊥ to indicate absence of any backup.
Dually, HALT is the only configuration denoting termination, more specifically it is an opaque and distinguished configuration
that indicates graceful termination.
Also, we define exception handling configurations, through which the processor goes whenever a halt happens in protected
mode or a violation happens in any mode.
Intuitively these configurations serve as a starting point for the exception handling routine provided by the attacker, whose
entry point address resides at address 0xFFFE:
EXC〈δ,t,ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉 , 〈δ, t,⊥,M,R0[pc 7→ M[0xFFFE]], 0xFFFE,⊥〉.
tEntry Point Prot. code Prot. Data Other
f
Entry Point/Prot. code r-x r-x rw- –x
Other –x — — rwx
Table IV: Definition of MACL(f , rght, t) function, where f and t are locations.
1) I/O device wrapper: The main transition system relies on an auxiliary transition system that synchronizes the evolution
of the I/O device with that of the CPU. For that, we define a “wrapper” around the device D:
D ` δ, t, ta ykD δ′, t′, t′a
Intuitively, assume that the device is in state δ, the clock time is t and the last interrupt was raised at time ta. Then, after k
cycles the new clock time will be t′ = t + k, the last interrupt was raised at time t′a and the new state will be δ
′. Note that
when no interrupt has to be handled, ta and t′a have the value ⊥.
Formally:
a ∈ {, int?}
k−1∧
i=0
δi
a
;D δi+1 t
′
a =

t+ j if ∃0 ≤ j < k. δj int?; D δj+1∧
∀j′ < j. δj′ ;D δj′+1
ta o.w.
D ` δ0, t, ta ykD δk, (t+ k), t′a
Property I.1. If D ` δ, t, ta ykD δ′, t′, t′a and D ` δ, t, ta ykD δ′′, t′′, t′′a , then δ′ = δ′′, t′ = t′′ and t′a = t′′a .
Proof. Trivial.
G. CPU mode
There are two further relations used by the main transition systems, specifying the CPU mode and the memory access
control, MAC.
The first tells when the given address, is an address in the protected code memory (PM) or in the unprotected one (UM):
pc, with m ∈ {PM, UM}
Formally:
pc ∈ [L.ts,L.te)
pc `mode PM
pc 6∈ [L.ts,L.te) ∪ [L.ds,L.de)
pc `mode UM
Also, we lift the definition to configurations as follows:
R[pc] `mode m
〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 `mode m HALT `mode UM
H. Memory access control
The second relation holds whenever the instruction i can be executed in a CPU configuration in which the previous program
counter is pcold , the registers are R and the backup is B, and takes the following form:
i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK
More precisely, it uses the predicate MACL(f , rght, t) (defined in Table IV) that holds whenever from the location f we
have the rights rght on location t. The predicate checks that (1) the code we came from (i.e., that in location pcold ) can
actually execute instructions located at R[pc]; (2) i can be executed in current CPU mode, and if i is a memory operation;
(3) from R[pc] we have the rights to perform the requested operation in memory. Formally, the definition of the relation is
the following:
R[sp] 6= 216 − 1 R[sp] + 2 6= 216 − 1 MACL(pcold , x,R[pc]) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 1 )
MACL(R[pc], r,R[sp]) MACL(R[pc], r,R[sp] + 1 ) MACL(R[pc], r,R[sp] + 2 ) MACL(R[pc], r,R[sp] + 3 )
RETI,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK
i ∈ {NOP, AND r1 r2, ADD r1 r2, SUB r1 r2, CMP r1 r2, MOV r1 r2, JMP &r, JZ &r}
MACL(pcold , x,R[pc]) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 1 )
i,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK
i ∈ {NOT r, MOV #w r}
MACL(pcold , x,R[pc]) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 1 ) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 2 ) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 3 )
i,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK
i ∈ {IN r, OUT r} R[pc] `mode UM MACL(pcold , x,R[pc]) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 1 )
i,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK
R[r1] 6= 216 − 1 R[r1] + 1 6= 216 − 1
MACL(R[pc], r,R[r1]) MACL(R[pc], r,R[r1] + 1 ) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc]) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 1 )
MOV @r1 r2,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK
R[r2] 6= 216 − 1 R[r2] + 1 6= 216 − 1 MACL(R[pc], w,R[r2]) MACL(R[pc], w,R[r2] + 1 )
MACL(pcold , x,R[pc]) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 1 ) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 2 ) MACL(pcold , x,R[pc] + 3 )
MOV r1 0(r2),R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK
i 6= RETI B 6= ⊥ i,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK R[sr].GIE = 0 R[pc] 6= ts
i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK
B 6= ⊥
RETI,R, pcold ,B `mac OK
Note that (i) for each word that is accessed in memory we also check that the first location is not the last byte of the memory
(except for the program counter, for which the decode function would fail since it would try to access undefined memory);
(ii) word accesses must be checked once for each byte of the word; and (iii) checks on pc guarantee that a memory violation
does not happen while decoding.
APPENDIX II
THE MAIN TRANSITION SYSTEM AND INTERRUPT LOGIC FOR SancusH AND SancusL
The main transition systems for our versions of Sancus share a large part of inference rules, and heavily differ on the way
interrupts are handled, as in SancusH there are none. Hereafter we assume as given a context C = 〈MC ,D〉.
A. SancusH
We now present the operational semantics of SancusH that relies a very simple auxiliary transition system for interrupts.
1) Main transition system: We represent how the SancusH configuration c becomes with a computation step c′ by the main
transition system, with transition of the following form:
D ` c→ c′
Figures 6, 7 and 8 report the full set of rules that define the main transition system of SancusH.
2) Interrupts in SancusH: Intuitively the transition system implements the logic that decides what happens when an interrupt
arrives, and its transitions have the following form:
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pcold ,B′〉
Interrupts in SancusH are always ignored, thus the configuration is left unchanged.
INT
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉
(CPU-DECODE-FAIL)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 decode(M,R[pc]) = ⊥
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → EXC〈δ,t,ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉
(CPU-HLT-UM)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 `mode UM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → HALT
decode(M,R[pc])) = HLT
(CPU-HLT-PM)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 `mode PM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → EXC〈δ,t+cycles(i),ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = HLT
(CPU-VIOLATION-PM)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B 6`mac OK
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → EXC〈δ,t+cycles(i),ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) 6= ⊥
(CPU-MOVL)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ M[R[r1]]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV @r1 r2
(CPU-MOVS)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 4] M′ =M[R[r2] 7→ R[r1]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV r1 0(r2)
(CPU-MOV)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV r1 r2
(CPU-MOVI)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 4][r 7→ w]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV#w r
(CPU-NOP)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = NOP
Figure 6: Rules of the main transition system for SancusH. (part I)
(CPU-JZ0)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = JZ &r ∧R[sr].Z = 0
(CPU-JZ1)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[r]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = JZ &r ∧R[sr].Z = 1
(CPU-JMP)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[r]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = JMP &r
(CPU-RETI-CHAIN)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 B 6= ⊥ i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a
R[sr.GIE] = 1 t′a 6= ⊥ D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′,R[pc],B〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′,R[pc],B〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-RETI-PREPAD)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 B 6= ⊥ i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a (R[sr.GIE] = 0 ∨ t′a = ⊥)
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,B.R,B.pcold , 〈⊥,⊥,B.tpad〉〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-RETI-PAD)
B = 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 D ` δ, t, ta y
tpad
D δ
′
, t
′
, t
′
a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M,R′, pcold ,B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M,R′, pcold ,B′〉
(CPU-RETI)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉
i,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ M[R[sp] + 2], sr 7→ M[R[sp]], sp 7→ R[sp] + 4] D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉 → 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],⊥〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-IN)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK δ
rd(w)
; D δ
′ R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r 7→ w]
D ` δ′, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = IN r
(CPU-OUT)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2]
δ
wr(R[r])
; D δ
′ D ` δ′, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = OUT r
Figure 7: Rules of the main transition system for SancusH. (part II)
(CPU-NOT)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r 7→ ¬R[r]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = NOT r
(CPU-AND)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1]&R[r2]]
R′′ = R′[sr.N 7→ R′[r2]&0x8000, sr.Z 7→ (R′[r2] == 0), sr.C 7→ (R′[r2] 6= 0), sr.V 7→ 0]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = AND r1 r2
(CPU-CMP)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1]−R[r2]]
R′′ = R′[sr.N 7→ (R′[r2] < 0), sr.Z 7→ (R′[r2] == 0), sr.C 7→ (R′[r2] 6= 0), sr.V 7→ overflow(R[r1]−R[r2])]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = CMP r1 r2
(CPU-ADD)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1] +R[r2]]
R′′ = R′[sr.N 7→ (R′[r2] < 0), sr.Z 7→ (R′[r2] == 0), sr.C 7→ (R′[r2] 6= 0), sr.V 7→ overflow(R[r1] +R[r2])]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = ADD r1 r2
(CPU-SUB)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1]−R[r2]]
R′′ = R′[sr.N 7→ (R′[r2] < 0), sr.Z 7→ (R′[r2] == 0), sr.C 7→ (R′[r2] 6= 0), sr.V 7→ overflow(R[r1]−R[r2])]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = SUB r1 r2
Figure 8: Rules of the main transition system for SancusH. (part III)
B. SancusL
The operational semantics of SancusL is given by a main transition system and one for interrupts that are handled securely
both in protected and unprotected mode.
1) Main transition system: As above, the main transition system describes how the SancusL configurations c, c′ evolve
during the execution given an I/O device D. Its transitions have the following form:
D ` c→ c′
Figures 9, 10 and 11 report the full set of rules that define the main transition system of SancusL.
2) Interrupts in SancusL: What happens in SancusL when an interrupt arrives is specified by the transition system with
transitions of the form (note that they differ from those of SancusH only in the arrow, that here is · ` · ↪→I ·)
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pcold ,B′〉
The following inference rules incorporate the mitigation described in depth in the paper to handle interrupts also in protected
mode (see rule (INT-PM-P) below).
(INT-UM-P)
pcold `mode UM R[sr].GIE = 1 ta 6= ⊥ R′ = R[pc 7→ isr , sr 7→ 0, sp 7→ R[sp]− 4]
M′ =M[R[sp]− 2 7→ R[pc],R[sp]− 4 7→ R[sr]] D ` δ, t,⊥y6D δ′, t′, t′a
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pcold ,B〉
(INT-UM-NP)
pcold `mode UM (R[sr].GIE = 0 ∨ ta = ⊥)
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉
(INT-PM-P)
k = MAX_TIME− (t− ta)
pcold `mode PM R[sr].GIE = 1 ta 6= ⊥ R′ = R0[pc 7→ isr ] D ` δ, t,⊥y6+kD δ′, t′, t′a B′ = 〈R, pcold , t− ta〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′, t′,⊥,M,R′, pcold ,B′〉
(INT-PM-NP)
pcold `mode PM (R[sr].GIE = 0 ∨ ta = ⊥)
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ↪→I 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉
It might be worthy to briefly describe what happens upon “corner cases”:
• Whenever an interrupt has to be handled in protected mode, but the current instruction lead the CPU in unprotected mode,
the padding mechanism is applied as in the standard case including the padding after the RETI. Indeed, if partial padding
(resp. no padding at all) was applied then the duration of the padding (resp. of the last instruction) would be leaked to
the attacker (cf. definition below).
• Interrupts arising during the padding before the interrupt service routine is invoked need to be ignored, since the padding
duration and the instruction duration would be leaked otherwise (cf. definition below, rule (INT-PM-P) ignores any interrupt
happening during the cycles needed for the interrupt logic and for the padding).
• Interrupts happening during the execution of the interrupt service routine are simply “chained” and handled as soon the
current routine is completed (see rule (CPU-RETI-CHAIN)).
• Finally, interrupts happening during the padding after the interrupt service routine are handled as any other interrupt
happening in protected mode (see rule (CPU-RETI-PAD)).
(CPU-DECODE-FAIL)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 decode(M,R[pc]) = ⊥
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → EXC〈δ,t,ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉
(CPU-HLT-UM)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 `mode UM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → HALT
decode(M,R[pc])) = HLT
(CPU-HLT-PM)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 `mode PM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → EXC〈δ,t+cycles(i),ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = HLT
(CPU-VIOLATION-PM)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B 6`mac OK
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → EXC〈δ,t+cycles(i),ta,M,R,pcold ,B〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) 6= ⊥
(CPU-MOVL)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ M[R[r1]]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV @r1 r2
(CPU-MOVS)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 4] M′ =M[R[r2] 7→ R[r1]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV r1 0(r2)
(CPU-MOV)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV r1 r2
(CPU-MOVI)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 4][r 7→ w]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc])) = MOV#w r
(CPU-NOP)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = NOP
Figure 9: Rules of the main transition system for SancusL. (part I)
(CPU-JZ0)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = JZ &r ∧R[sr].Z = 0
(CPU-JZ1)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[r]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = JZ &r ∧R[sr].Z = 1
(CPU-JMP)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[r]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = JMP &r
(CPU-RETI-CHAIN)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 B 6= ⊥ i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a
R[sr.GIE] = 1 t′a 6= ⊥ D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′,R[pc],B〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′,R[pc],B〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-RETI-PREPAD)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 B 6= ⊥ i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a (R[sr.GIE] = 0 ∨ t′a = ⊥)
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,B.R,B.pcold , 〈⊥,⊥,B.tpad〉〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-RETI-PAD)
B = 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 D ` δ, t, ta y
tpad
D δ
′
, t
′
, t
′
a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M,R′, pcold ,B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M,R′, pcold ,B′〉
(CPU-RETI)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉
i,R, pcold ,⊥ `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ M[R[sp] + 2], sr 7→ M[R[sp]], sp 7→ R[sp] + 4] D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉 → 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],⊥〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = RETI
(CPU-IN)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK δ
rd(w)
; D δ
′ R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r 7→ w]
D ` δ′, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = IN r
(CPU-OUT)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2]
δ
wr(R[r])
; D δ
′ D ` δ′, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = OUT r
Figure 10: Rules of the main transition system for SancusL. (part II)
(CPU-NOT)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r 7→ ¬R[r]]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = NOT r
(CPU-AND)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1]&R[r2]]
R′′ = R′[sr.N 7→ R′[r2]&0x8000, sr.Z 7→ (R′[r2] == 0), sr.C 7→ (R′[r2] 6= 0), sr.V 7→ 0]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = AND r1 r2
(CPU-CMP)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1]−R[r2]]
R′′ = R′[sr.N 7→ (R′[r2] < 0), sr.Z 7→ (R′[r2] == 0), sr.C 7→ (R′[r2] 6= 0), sr.V 7→ overflow(R[r1]−R[r2])]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = CMP r1 r2
(CPU-ADD)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1] +R[r2]]
R′′ = R′[sr.N 7→ (R′[r2] < 0), sr.Z 7→ (R′[r2] == 0), sr.C 7→ (R′[r2] 6= 0), sr.V 7→ overflow(R[r1] +R[r2])]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = ADD r1 r2
(CPU-SUB)
B 6= 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉 i,R, pcold ,B `mac OK R′ = R[pc 7→ R[pc] + 2][r2 7→ R[r1]−R[r2]]
R′′ = R′[sr.N 7→ (R′[r2] < 0), sr.Z 7→ (R′[r2] == 0), sr.C 7→ (R′[r2] 6= 0), sr.V 7→ overflow(R[r1]−R[r2])]
D ` δ, t, ta ycycles(i)D δ′, t′, t′a D ` 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M,R′′,R[pc],B〉 ↪→I 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′′, t′′, t′′a ,M′,R′′′,R[pc],B′〉
i = decode(M,R[pc]) = SUB r1 r2
Figure 11: Rules of the main transition system for SancusL. (part III)
APPENDIX III
SECURITY THEOREMS
Security of SancusL is obtained by proving it fully abstract w.r.t. SancusH. We define full abstraction here relying on the
convergence of whole programs.
Definition III.1. Let C = 〈MC ,D〉 be a context, and MM be a software module. A whole program C[MM ] converges in
SancusH (written C[MM ]⇓H) iff
D ` INITC[MM ] →∗ HALT.
Similarly, the same whole program converges in SancusL (written C[MM ]⇓L) iff
D ` INITC[MM ] →∗ HALT.
The following definition formalizes the notion of contextual equivalence of two software modules. Recall from the paper
that contextually equivalent software modules behave in the same way under any attacker (i.e., context).
Definition III.2. Two software modules MM and MM ′ are contextually equivalent in SancusH, written MM 'HMM ′ , iff
∀C. (C[MM ]⇓H ⇐⇒ C[MM ′ ]⇓H) .
Similarly, two software modules MM and MM ′ are contextually equivalent in SancusL, written MM 'LMM ′ , iff
∀C. (C[MM ]⇓L ⇐⇒ C[MM ′ ]⇓L) .
Theorem III.1 (Full abstraction). ∀MM ,MM ′ . (MM 'HMM ′ ⇐⇒ MM 'LMM ′).
For proving the full abstraction theorem we first easily establish that (MM 'H MM ′ ⇐MM 'L MM ′) (Lemma III.2),
i.e. reflection of behavious. Then, the other implication, i.e. preservation of behaviours is proved by Lemma III.3 following the
strategy summarized in Figure 12. There we use the trace equivalence T= of Definition III.5. Intuitively, we say that a module
M plugged in a context performs a trace made of those actions performed by M that can be observed by an attacker, i.e. when
a call to M occurs and when instead M returns; also information about the contents of the registers will be recorded in both
cases, and also on the flow of time in the second case. Two modules are then equivalent if they exhibit the same traces. Proving
preservation is then done in two steps, the composition of which gives (iii) in Figure 12. First Lemma III.8 establishies (ii)
in Figure 12: two modules equivalent in SancusH are trace equivalent. Then Lemma III.7 establishes (i) in Figure 12: two
modules that are trace equivalent are also equivalent in SancusL.
A. Reflection of behaviors
To prove the reflection of behaviors, i.e., that for all MM ,MM ′ .MM 'LMM ′ implies MM 'HMM ′ we first need to
introduce the notion of interrupt-less context C6 I for a context C. Intuitively, C6 I behaves as C but never raises any interrupt.
In practice, we obtain it from C by removing in the device the transitions that may raise an interrupt. Formally:
Definition III.3. Let D = 〈∆, δinit, a;D〉 be an I/O device. Given a context C = 〈MC ,D〉, we define its corresponding
interrupt-less context as C6 I = 〈MC , a;D6 I〉 where:
• D6 I = 〈∆, δinit, a;D6 I〉, and
• a;D6 I ,
a
;D ∪{(δ, , δ′) | (δ, int?, δ′) ∈ a;D} \ {(δ, int?, δ′) | (δ, int?, δ′) ∈ a;D}.
Note that D6 I is actually a device, due to the contraints on its transition function.
The behavior of interrupt-less contexts in SancusL has a direct correspondence to the behavior of their standard counterparts
in SancusH (recall that SancusH ignores all the interrupts). In fact:
MM 'HMM ′
MM 'LMM ′ MM T=MM ′
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Figure 12: An illustration of the proof strategy of preservation of behaviours.
Lemma III.1. For any module MM , context C, and corresponding interrupt-less context C6 I :
C6 I [MM ]⇓L ⇐⇒ C[MM ]⇓H
Proof. By definition of D ` ·ykD ·, the value ta in the CPU configuration (that signals the presence of an unhandled interrupt)
is changed only when an interrupt has been raised since the last time it was checked.
Since any int? action has been substituted with an , ta is never changed from its initial ⊥ value.
Since the only difference in behavior between the two levels is in the interrupt logic, and since the ISR in C6 I is never
invoked (thus, it does not affect the program behavior), D ` · ↪→I · behaves exactly as D ` · ↪→I ·. So, C6 I [MM ]⇓L implies
C[MM ]⇓H and vice versa.
Given Definition III.3 and Lemma III.1 it is relatively easy to prove reflection, since whole programs in SancusH behave
just like a subset of whole programs in SancusL:
Lemma III.2 (Reflection).
∀MM ,MM ′ . (MM 'LMM ′ =⇒ MM 'HMM ′).
Proof. We can expand the hypothesis using the definition of 'L and 'H as follows:
(∀C.C[MM ]⇓L ⇐⇒ C[MM ′ ]⇓L) =⇒ (∀C ′. C ′[MM ]⇓H ⇐⇒ C ′[MM ′ ]⇓H).
For any C ′ we can build the corresponding interrupt-less context C ′6 I .
Since interrupt-less contexts are a (strict) subset of all the contexts, by hypothesis:
C ′6 I [MM ]⇓L ⇐⇒ C ′6 I [MM ′ ]⇓L.
But from Lemma III.1 it follows that
C ′[MM ]⇓H ⇐⇒ C ′[MM ′ ]⇓H.
B. Preservation of behaviors
The preservation of behaviors is stated as follows:
Lemma III.3.
∀MM ,MM ′ . (MM 'HMM ′ ⇒MM 'LMM ′).
Its proof is harder than the one of reflection and requires the definition of a trace semantics whose traces, intuitively,
correspond to the behaviors that an attacker can observe in SancusL.
1) Fine-grained and coarse-grained trace semantics: To simplify the extraction of the traces we first define a very fine-
grained trace semantics and then we transform it to a more coarse-grained one to match what attackers can observe.
The fine-grained trace semantics has the following observables (k ∈ N):
α ::= ξ | τ(k) | •
jmpIn?(R) | jmpOut!(k;R)
reti?(k) | handle!(k).
Traces are defined as strings of observables α, and we denote the empty trace as ε.
Intuitively, ξ denotes actions performed by the context that are not observed, τ(k) indicates an internal action taking k
cycles. The observable • indicates that termination occurred. A jmpIn?(R) happens when the CPU enters protected mode,
jmpOut!(k;R) happens when it exits. Finally, handle!(k) and reti?(k) denote when the processor starts executing the
interrupt service routine from protected mode and when it returns from it, respectively.
The relation α===⇒ in Figure 13 formally defines how observables can be extracted from the execution of a whole program. It
is worth noting that the relation α===⇒ is defined in such a way that each transition D ` c → c′ has a corresponding transition
D ` c α===⇒ c′ for some α, possibly the non observable one, ξ.
Fine-grained traces α¯ are obtained by transitively and reflexively closing α===⇒, written α¯===⇒∗. Note that in any trace α¯, only
the observables τ(k), reti?(k) or handle!(k) can occur between a jmpIn?(R) and a jmpOut!(∆t;R).
When an interrupt has to be handled, the trace that is observed starts with an handle!(·), followed by a sequence of ξ and,
if a RETI is executed, a reti?(k) (k always has value cycles(RETI)) is observed.
If the interrupted instruction was a jump from protected mode to unprotected mode, the reti?(·) is followed by a jmpOut!(·; ·)
(cf. rules (OBS-HANDLE), (OBS-INTERNAL-UM), (OBS-RETI) and (OBS-JMPOUT-POSTPONED)), otherwise a τ(·) – or a
handle!(·) if an interrupt has to be handled – is observed.
(OBS-INTERNAL-PM)
R[pc] `mode PM D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,⊥〉 R′[pc] `mode PM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉
τ(k)
====⇒ 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,⊥〉
(OBS-JMPIN)
R[pc] `mode UM D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉 → 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,⊥〉 R′[pc] `mode PM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉
jmpIn?(R′)
========⇒ 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,⊥〉
(OBS-RETI)
R[pc] `mode UM B 6= ⊥ D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old , 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉〉
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉
reti?(k)
=======⇒ 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old , 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉〉
(OBS-JMPOUT)
R[pc] `mode PM D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉 → 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,⊥〉 R′[pc] `mode UM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,⊥〉
jmpOut!(k;R′)
==========⇒ 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,B′〉
(OBS-JMPOUT-POSTPONED)
R[pc] `mode UM D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold , 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉〉 → 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,⊥〉 R′[pc] `mode UM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold , 〈⊥,⊥, tpad〉〉
jmpOut!(k;R′)
==========⇒ 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,B′〉
(OBS-HANDLE)
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,B′〉 R′[pc] `mode UM B′ 6= ⊥
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉
handle!(k)
========⇒ 〈δ′, t+ k, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,B′〉
(OBS-INTERNAL-UM)
R[pc] `mode UM D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,B〉 R′[pc] `mode UM
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ξ==⇒ 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,B〉
(OBS-FINAL)
R[pc] `mode UM D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 → HALT
D ` 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 •==⇒ HALT
Figure 13: Formal definition of relation α===⇒ for fine-grained observables.
Actually, these traces contain more information than what an attacker (i.e., the context) can observe. To match what the context
can observe we introduce more coarse-grained traces with the following observables, where jmpIn?(R) and jmpOut!(∆t;R)
represent invoking a module and returning from it:
β ::= • | jmpIn?(R) | jmpOut!(∆t;R).
Traces β are defined as strings of β actions with ε as the empty trace.
Note that observables for interrupts and silent actions are not visible anymore. In addition, jmpOut!(∆t;R) has a ∆t
parameter that models that an attacker can just measure the end-to-end time of a piece of code running in protected mode.
Definition III.4 (Traces of a module). The set of (observable) traces of the module M is
Tr(MM ) , {β | ∃C = 〈MC ,D〉.D ` INITC[MM ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c′}.
where ·==⇒ ∗ is the reflexive and transitive closure of the ·==⇒ relation defined in Figure 14.
We eventually define when two modules are trace equivalent:
D ` INITC[MM ]
ξ···ξ·jmpIn?(R)
===========⇒∗ c
D ` INITC[MM ]
jmpIn?(R)
========⇒ c
D ` INITC[MM ]
ξ···ξ·•
=====⇒∗ HALT
D ` INITC[MM ] •==⇒ HALT
∃c.D ` c jmpOut!(∆t;R
′)
===========⇒ c′ D ` c′ ξ···ξ·jmpIn?(R
′′)
============⇒∗ c′′
D ` c′ jmpIn?(R
′′)
=========⇒ c′′
∃c.D ` c jmpOut!(∆t;R
′)
===========⇒ c′ D ` c′ ξ···ξ·•=====⇒∗ HALT
D ` c′ •==⇒ HALT
∃c.D ` c jmpIn?(R
′)
========⇒ c′
D ` c′ α
(0)···α(n−1)·jmpOut!(k′′;R′′)
====================⇒∗ c′′ ∀0 ≤ i < n. αi /∈ {jmpOut!(_; _), •} ∆t = k′′ +
n−1∑
i=0
time(α(i))
D ` c′ jmpOut!(∆t;R
′′)
===========⇒ c′′
∃c.D ` c jmpIn?(R
′)
========⇒ c′ D ` c′ α0···αn−1·•=========⇒∗ HALT ∀0 ≤ i < n. αi /∈ {jmpOut!(_; _), •}
D ` c′ •==⇒ HALT
where
time(α) =
{
k if α ∈ {reti?(k), handle!(k), τ(k), jmpOut!(k;R)}
0 o.w.
Figure 14: Formal definition of relation
β
==⇒ for coarse-grained observables.
Definition III.5. Two modules are (coarse-grained) trace equivalent, written MM T=MM ′ , iff
Tr(MM ) = Tr(MM ′).
a) Notation.: If not specified, let x ∈ {1, 2}, in the rest of the report. Moreover, beside using c, c1, c2, . . . , possibly dashed,
to denote configurations, we will write c(n)x = 〈δ(n)x , t(n)x , t(n)ax ,M(n)x ,R(n)x , pcold (n)x ,B(n)x 〉 for the configuration reached after
n execution steps from the initial configuration c(0)x . Similarly, the components of a context Cx will be accordingly indexed.
Also, we will denote with c(i)x the configuration right before the action of index i in a given fine or coarse-grained trace.
Finally, we define some notions and prove a property that will be of use in the rest of the report. The first definition defines a
partitioning of fine-grained traces in sub-traces that correspond to handling interrupts and those that are not. We call (complete)
interrupt segments those starting with an handle!(·) action (in the ith position in the given trace) and ending with a reti?(·)
action (in the jth position). In this way the set of interrupt segments is a set of pairs (i, j), as defined below.
Definition III.6 (Complete interrupt segments). Let α = α0 · · · αn be a fine-grained trace. The set Iα of complete interrupt
segments of α is defined as follows:
Iα , {(i, j) | αi = handle!(k) ∧ αj = reti?(k′) ∧ i < j ∧ ∀i < l < j. αl = ξ}.
The second definition expresses the time taken by the current protected-mode instruction in the given configuration to be
executed.
Definition III.7. We define the length of the current protected-mode instruction in configuration c as
γ(c) ,
{
cycles(decode(M,R[pc])) if c `mode PM ∧ B = ⊥
0 o.w.
Property III.1. If c(0) `mode PM and D ` c(0) α===⇒∗ c(n+1), with α = α(0) · · ·α(n−1) · jmpOut!(k(n);R′), then
k +
∑n−1
i=0 time(α
(i)) =
∑n
i=0 γ(c
(i)) + (11 + MAX_TIME) · |Iα|.
Proof. By definition of the interrupt logic and the operational semantics of SancusL, for each interrupt handled in protected
mode we perform a 0 ≤ k ≤ MAX_TIME padding before invoking the interrupt service routine and an additional padding of
(MAX_TIME − k) cycles after its execution, i.e., the padding time introduced for each complete interrupt segment amounts to
MAX_TIME. Also, since the interrupt logic always requires 6 cycles to jump to the interrupt service routine and 5 cycles are
required upon RETI it easily follows that:
k +
n−1∑
i=0
time(α(i)) =
n∑
i=0
γ(c(i)) + (11 + MAX_TIME) · |Iα|.
Before we move to the actual proof of preservation of behaviours, it is convenient introducing two relations (actually, two
equivalences) between configurations and to establish a number of useful properties. Roughly, the equivalences holds two
configurations cannot be kept apart by looking at those parts that can be inspected when the CPU is operating in either
protected mode or unprotected mode, respectively.
Definition III.8. We say that two configurations are P -equivalent (written c
P≈ c′) iff
(c = c′ = HALT) ∨
(c = 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ∧ c′ = 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,B′〉 ∧ M P=M′ ∧
pcold `mode m ∧ pc′old `mode m ∧ R
PMm R′ ∧ B ./ B′)
where
• M P=M′ iff ∀l ∈ [ts, te) ∪ [ds, de). M [l] =M′[l].
• R PMm R′ iff (m = PM =⇒ R = R′)
• B ./ B′ iff (B 6= ⊥ ∧ B′ 6= ⊥) ∨ (B = B′ = ⊥).
Definition III.9. We say that two configurations are U -equivalent (written c
U≈ c′) iff
(c = c′ = HALT) ∨
(c = 〈δ, t, ta,M,R, pcold ,B〉 ∧ c′ = 〈δ′, t′, t′a,M′,R′, pc′old ,B′〉 ∧ M U=M′ ∧
c `mode m ∧ c′ `mode m ∧ δ = δ′ ∧ t = t′ ∧ ta = t′a ∧ R
UMm R′ ∧ B ./ B′)
where
• M U=M′ iff ∀l 6∈ [ts, te) ∪ [ds, de). M [l] =M′[l]
• R UMm R′ iff (m = UM =⇒ R = R′) ∧ R[sr.GIE] = R′[sr.GIE]
• B ./ B′ iff (B 6= ⊥ ∧ B′ 6= ⊥) ∨ (B = B′ = ⊥).
Property III.2. Both
P≈ and U≈ are equivalence relations.
Proof. Trivial.
2) Properties of P -equivalence: The first property says that if a configuration can take a step, also another P-equivalent
configuration can.
Property III.3. If c1
P≈ c2, c1 `mode PM, D′ ` c1 → c′1 then decode(M1,R1[pc]) = decode(M2,R2[pc]) and D′ ` c2 → c′2.
Proof. Since c1
P≈ c2 and c1 `mode PM, it also holds that c2 `mode PM. Also, the instruction decode(M1,R1[pc]) is decoded in
both M1 and M2 at the same protected address, hence decode(M1,R1[pc]) = decode(M2,R2[pc]), and D′ ` c2 → c′2.
Property III.4. If c1
P≈ c2, c1 `mode PM, D ` c1 → c′1, D′ ` c2 → c′2 and B′1 ./ B′2 then c′1
P≈ c′2.
Proof. Since c1
P≈ c2, c1 `mode PM and D ` c1 → c′1, by Property III.3, i = decode(M1,R1[pc]) = decode(M2,R2[pc]) and
D′ ` c2 → c′2.
Sinc B′1 ./ B′2, we have two cases:
1) Case B′1 = B′2 = ⊥. In this case we know that no interrupt handling started during the step, and by exhaustive cases on
i we can show c′1
P≈ c′2:
• Case i ∈ {HLT, IN r, OUT r}. In both cases we have c′1 = EXCc1
P≈ EXCc2 = c′2.
• Otherwise. The relevant values in c′1 and c
′
2 just depend on values that coincide also in c1 and c2. Hence, by determinism
of the rules, we get c′1
P≈ c′2.
2) Case B′1 6= ⊥ and B′2 6= ⊥. In this case an interrupt was handled, but the same instruction was indeed executed in
protected mode, hence M′1 P= M′2. Also, R′1
PMUM R′2 holds trivially, B′1 ./ B′2 by hypothesis and pc′old 1 `mode UM and
pc′old 2 `mode UM. Thus, c′1
P≈ c′2.
Some sequences of fine-grained traces preserve P -equivalence.
Property III.5. If c1
P≈ c2, D ` c1
`1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′1
jmpIn?(R)
========⇒ c′′1 , D′ ` c2
`2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′2
jmpIn?(R)
========⇒ c′′2 , then c′′1
P≈ c′′2 .
Proof. We show by Noetherian induction over (`1, `2) thatM′1 P=M′2. For that, we use well-founded relation (`1, `2) ≺ (`′1, `′2)
iff `1 < `′1 ∧ `2 < `′2.
• Case (0, 0). Trivial.
• Case (0, `2), with `2 > 0. (and symmetrically (`1, 0), with `1 > 0) We have to show that
D ` c1 ε==⇒∗ c′1 ∧ D′ ` c2
`2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′2 ⇒M′1 P=M′2
Since from c1 there is no step, c1 = c′1. Moreover a sequence of ξ was observed starting from c2, and since both
configurations are in unprotected mode and no violation occurred (see Table IV) the protected memory is unchanged.
Thus, by transitivity of P=, we have M′1 =M1 P=M2 P=M′2.
• Case (`1, `2) = (`′1 + 1, `
′
2 + 1). If
D ` c1
`′1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′′′1 ∧ D′ ` c2
`′2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′′′2 ⇒M′′′1 P=M′′′2 (IHP)
then
D ` c1
`′1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′′′1 ξ==⇒ c′1 ∧ D′ ` c2
`′2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′′′2 ξ==⇒ c′2 ⇒M′1 P=M′2.
By (IHP) we know that M′′′1 P= M′′′2 . Indeed, since we observed ξ it means that pcold ′1 `mode m ∧ pcold ′2 `mode m.
Moreover (see Figure 13) since ξ was observed starting from c′′′1 and from c
′′′
2 and since both configurations are in
unprotected mode, protected memory is unchanged. Thus, M′1 P=M′′′1 P=M′′′2 P=M′2.
Since the instruction generating α = jmpIn?(R) was executed in unprotected mode, we have that M′′1 P= M′′2 . Also
R′′1 = R
PMPM R = R′′2 , pc′old ′′1 `mode UM, pc′old ′′2 `mode UM and B′′1 ./ B′′2 .
Property III.6. If c1
P≈ c2, D ` c1 handle!(k1)=========⇒∗ c′1
`1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′′1
reti?(k′1)========⇒ c′′′1 ,
D′ ` c2 handle!(k2)=========⇒∗ c′2
`2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′′2
reti?(k′2)========⇒ c′′′2 , then c′′′1
P≈ c′′′2 .
Proof. Since upon observation of handle!(kx) the protected memory cannot be modified, we know that M′1 P=M′2.
We show by Noetherian induction over (`1, `2) that M′′1 P=M′′2 . For that, we use well-founded relation (`1, `2) ≺ (`′1, `′2)
iff `1 < `′1 ∧ `2 < `′2.
• Case (0, 0). Trivial.
• Case (0, `2), with `2 > 0 (and symmetrically (`1, 0), with `1 > 0). We have to show that
D ` c′1 ε==⇒∗ c′′1 ∧ D′ ` c′2
`2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ c′′2 ⇒M′′1 P=M′′2
Since from c′1 there is no step, c
′′
1 = c
′
1. Moreover a sequence of ξ was observed starting from c
′
2, and since both
configurations are in unprotected mode and no violation occurred (see Table IV) the protected memory is unchanged.
Thus, by transitivity of P=, we have M′′1 =M′1 P=M′2 P=M′′2 .
• Case (`1, `2) = (`′1 + 1, `
′
2 + 1). If
D ` c′1
`′1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ civ1 ∧ D′ ` c′2
`′2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ civ2 ⇒Miv1 P=Miv2 (IHP)
then
D ` c′1
`′1︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ civ1 ξ==⇒ c′′1 ∧ D′ ` c′2
`′2︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξ ··· ξ
======⇒∗ civ2 ξ==⇒ c′′2 ⇒M′′1 P=M′′2 .
By (IHP) we know that Miv1 P=Miv2 . Indeed, since we observed ξ it means that pcold ′′1 `mode UM ∧ `mode UMpcold ′′2 .
Moreover (see Figure 13) since ξ was observed starting from civ1 and from c
iv
2 and since both configurations are in
unprotected mode, no violation occurred and by Table IV protected memory is unchanged. Thus, by transitivity of P=, we
have M′′1 P=Miv1 P=Miv2 P=M′′2 .
Thus, we have that M′′′1 P=M′′′2 , since α = reti?(·) does not modify protected memory. Also R′′′1
PMUM R′′′2 , B′′′1 ./ B′′′2 ,
pc′old 1 `mode UM and pc′old 2 `mode UM, by definition of α = reti?(·).
Property III.7. If c1
P≈ c2, c1 `mode PM, D ` c1 α1===⇒ c′1, D′ ` c2 α2===⇒ c′2, α1, α2 6= handle!(·) then α1 = α2 and c′1
P≈ c′2.
Proof. By definition of fine-grained traces we know that the transition leading to the observation of α1 happens upon the
execution of an instruction that must also be executed starting from c2 (by Property III.3) and that c′1
P≈ c′2 (by Property III.4).
Also, since c1 `mode PM, we know that α1 ∈ {τ(k1), jmpOut!(k1;R1)}. Thus, in both cases and since by hypothesis α2 6=
handle!(·), it must be that α2 = α1.
Property III.8. If c1
P≈ c2, D ` c1 τ(k
(0)
1 ) ··· τ(k
(n1−1)
1 )·α1=================⇒∗ c′1, D′ ` c2
τ(k
(0)
2 ) ··· τ(k
(n2−1)
2 )·α2=================⇒∗ c′2, and α1, α2 6= handle!(·)
then τ(k(0)1 ) · · · τ(k(n1−1)1 ) · α1 = τ(k(0)2 ) · · · τ(k(n2−1)2 ) · α2 and c′1
P≈ c′2.
Proof. Corollary of Property III.7.
P -equivalence is preserved by complete interrupt segments (recall Definition III.6). Indeed, from now onwards denote
αx ∈{ε}∪
{α(0)x · · ·α(nx−1)x | nx ≥ 1 ∧ α(nx−1)x = reti?(k(nx−1)x )∧
∀i. 0 ≤ i ≤ nx − 1. α(i)x /∈ {•, jmpIn?(R(i)x ), jmpOut!(k(i)x ;R(i)x )}}.
Property III.9. Let D and D′ be two devices.
If c(0)1
P≈ c(0)2 , D ` c1
jmpIn?(R)
========⇒ c(0)1 α1===⇒∗ c(n1)1 and D′ ` c2
jmpIn?(R)
========⇒ c(0)2 α2===⇒∗ c(n2)2 then c(n1)1
P≈ c(n2)2 .
Proof. We first show by induction on |Iα1 | (see Definition III.6) that
D ` c(0)1 α1===⇒∗ c(n1)1 ∧ D′ ` c(0)2 α2===⇒∗ c(n2)1 ⇒ c(n1)1
P≈ c(n2)2
assuming wlog that |Iα2 | ≤ |Iα1 |.
• Case |Iα1 | = 0. Trivial.
• Case |Iα1 | = |Iα′1 |+ 1. If
D ` c(0)1
α′1===⇒∗ c(n′1)1 ∧ D′ ` c(0)2
α′2===⇒∗ c(n′2)2 ⇒ c(n
′
1)
1
P≈ c(n′2)2 (IHP)
then
D ` c(0)1 α1===⇒∗ c(n1)1 ∧ D′ ` c(0)2 α2===⇒∗ c(n2)2 ⇒ c(n1)1
P≈ c(n2)2
Now let (i1, j1) be the new interrupt segment of α1 that we split it as follows:
α1 = α
′
1 · τ(k(n
′
1)
1 ) · · · τ(k(i1−1)1 ) · handle!(k(i1)1 ) · · · reti?(k(j1)1 )
The following two exhaustive cases may arise.
1) Case |Iα1 | = |Iα2 |. For some (i2, j2) we then have:
α2 = α
′
2 · τ(k(n
′
2)
2 ) · · · τ(k(i2−1)2 ) · handle!(k(i2)2 ) · · · reti?(k(j2)2 )
By Properties III.8 and III.6 we know that c(n1)1
P≈ c(n2)2 , being reached through α(j1)1 and α(j2)2 .
2) Case |Iα2 | < |Iα1 |. In this case we have
α2 = α
′
2 · τ(k(n
′
2)
2 ) · · · τ(k(n2−2)2 ) · τ(k(n2−1)2 )
with c`1
P≈ c`2 for n′2 ≤ ` ≤ n2 − 2 = i1 − 1, where the last equality holds because the module is executing from
configurations that are P -equivalent. As soon as the interrupt arrives, the same instruction is executed (Property III.3)
that causes the same changes in the registers, the old program counter and the protected memory. In turn the first two
are stored in the backup before handling the interrupt. They are then restored by the RETI, observed as α(j1)1 , while
the protected memory is left untouched. Consequently, we have that c(n1)1
P≈ c(n2)2 , that are the configurations reached
through α(j1)1 and τ(k
(n2)−1
2 ).
Finally, we can show that P -equivalence is preserved by coarse-grained traces:
Property III.10. If D ` INITC[MM ]
jmpIn?(R)
========⇒ c1 and D′ ` INITC′[MM ]
jmpIn?(R)
========⇒ c2 then c1 P≈ c2.
Proof. By definition of coarse-grained traces, we have that in both premises jmpIn?(R) is preceded by a sequence of ξ actions
(possibly in different numbers). Since neither ξ actions nor jmpIn?(R) ever change the protected memory (by definition of
memory access control) and since the jmpIn?(R) sets the registers to the values in R, it follows that c1 P≈ c2.
The following definition gives an equality up to timings among coarse-grained traces:
Definition III.10. Let β = β0 . . . βn and β
′
= β′0 . . . β
′
n′ be two coarse-grained traces. We say that β is equal up to timings
to β
′
(written β ≈ β′) iff
n = n′ ∧ (∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. βi = β′i ∨ (βi = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′i = jmpOut!(∆t′;R))).
and the following property shows that if traces that are equal up to timings preserve P -equivalence:
Property III.11. If c1
P≈ c2, D ` c1 β==⇒ ∗ c′1, D′ ` c2 β
′
===⇒ ∗ c′2 and β ≈ β
′
then c′1
P≈ c′2.
Proof. The thesis easily follows from Property III.5 and Property III.9.
3) Properties of U -equivalence: Also for U-equivalent configurations it holds that when one takes a step, also the other
does.
Property III.12. If c1
U≈ c2, c1 `mode UM then decode(M1,R1[pc]) = decode(M2,R2[pc]).
Proof. Since c1
U≈ c2 and c1 `mode UM, it also holds that c2 `mode UM. Also, the instruction decode(M1,R1[pc]) is decoded
in both M1 and M2 at the same unprotected address, hence decode(M1,R1[pc]) = decode(M2,R2[pc]).
Next we prove that
U≈ is preserved by unprotected-mode steps of the SancusL operational semantics:
Property III.13. If c1
U≈ c2, c1 `mode UM and D ` c1 → c′1, then D ` c2 → c′2 ∧ c′1
U≈ c′2.
Proof. Since c1
U≈ c2, c1 `mode UM and D ` c1 → c′1, by Property III.12, i = decode(M1,R1[pc]) = decode(M2,R2[pc]).
To show that c′1
U≈ c′2, we consider the following exhaustive cases:
• Case i = ⊥. Since c1 U≈ c2 we get c2 `mode UM and by definition of · ` · → · we get c′1 = EXCc1 and c′2 = EXCc2 .
However, by definition of EXC·, we have that M′1 U= M′2, c′1 `mode UM, c′2 `mode UM, δ′1 = δ1 = δ2 = δ′2, t′1 = t1 =
t2 = t
′
2, t
′
a1 = ta1 = ta2 = t
′
a2 , R′1
UMm R′2, and ⊥ = B′1 ./ B′2 = ⊥, i.e., c′1
U≈ c′2.
• Case i = HLT. Trivial, since c′1 = HALT = c
′
2.
• Case i 6= ⊥. We have the following exhaustive sub-cases, depending on c′1:
– Case c′1 = EXCc1 . In this case a violation occurred, i.e., i,R1, pcold 1,B1 6`mac OK. However, the same violation also
occurs for c2, since the only parts that may keep c1 apart from c2 are pcold and B, and thus c′1
U≈ c′2 because:
∗ pcold 2 6= pcold 1, cannot cause a failure since unprotected code is executable from anywhere,
∗ B1 = 〈R1, pcold 1, tpad1〉 6= 〈R2, pcold 2, tpad2〉 = B2, cannot cause a failure since the additional conditions on the
configuration imposed by the memory access control only concern values that are the same in both configurations.
– Case c′1 6= EXCc1 and i = RETI. If B1 = ⊥, then B1 = B2 = B′1 = B′2 = ⊥, hence rule (CPU-RETI) of Figure 10
applies and we get c′1
U≈ c′2 since R′1 = R′2 and D ` · y·D · is a deterministic relation (Property I.1). If B1 6= ⊥ it
must also be that B2 6= ⊥ by U -equivalence, so either rule (CPU-RETI-CHAIN) or rule (CPU-RETI-PREPAD) applies. In
the first case we get c′1
U≈ c′2 because c1
U≈ c2 and by determinism of D ` ·y·D · and D ` · ↪→I ·. In the second case
we get c′1
U≈ c′2 since 〈⊥,⊥, t′pad1〉 = B′1 ./ B′2 = 〈⊥,⊥, t′pad2〉 and R′1
UMPM R′2 holds since we restored the register
files from backups in which the interrupts were enabled (otherwise the CPU would not have handled the interrupt it is
returning from).
– Case c′1 6= EXCc1 and i 6∈ {⊥, HLT, RETI}. All the other rules depend on both (i) parts of the configurations that are
equal due to c1
U≈ c2, and on (ii) D ` ·y5D · and D ` · ↪→I · which are deterministic and have the same inputs (since
c1
U≈ c2). Hence, c′1
U≈ c′2 as requested.
The above property carries on fine-grained traces, provided that the computation is carried on in unprotected mode:
Property III.14. If c1
U≈ c2, c1 `mode UM, D ` c1 α===⇒ c′1 then D ` c2 α===⇒ c′2 and c′1
U≈ c′2.
Proof. Properties III.12 and III.13 guarantee that c′1
U≈ c′2 and i = decode(M1,R1[pc]) = decode(M2,R2[pc]). Thus, since
the same i is executed under U -equivalent configurations and since c′1
U≈ c′2, we have that D ` c2 α===⇒ c′2.
Property III.15. If c1
U≈ c2, c1 `mode UM, D ` c1 ξ···ξ·α======⇒∗ c′1 and α ∈ {ξ, •, jmpIn?(R), reti?(k)} then D ` c2 ξ···ξ·α======⇒∗ c′2
and c′1
U≈ c′2.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the length n of ξ · · · ξ.
• Case n = 0. Property III.14 applies.
• Case n′ = n+1. By induction hypothesis for some c′′′1 , c
′′′
2 , c
′′
1 and c
′′
2 we have D ` c1
n′︷︸︸︷
ξ···ξ
=====⇒ c′′′1 α===⇒ c′′1 , D ` c2
n′︷︸︸︷
ξ···ξ
=====⇒
c′′′2
α
===⇒ c′′2 and c′′1
U≈ c′′2 . Thus, if D ` c′′′1 ξ==⇒ civ1 (i.e., we observe a further ξ starting from c1), by Property III.14 we
get D ` c′′′2 ξ==⇒ civ2 and civ1
U≈ civ2 . Finally, by Property III.14 applies on civ1 and civ2 we get the thesis.
Now we move our attention to handle!(·).
Property III.16. If c(0)1
U≈ c(0)2 , D ` c(0)1
τ(k
(0)
1 ) ··· τ(k
(n1−1)
1 )·handle!(k
(n1)
1 )=========================⇒∗ c(n1+1)1 and
D ` c(0)2
τ(k
(0)
2 ) ··· τ(k
(n2−1)
2 )·handle!(k
(n2)
2 )=========================⇒∗ c(n2+1)2 then c(n1+1)1
U≈ c(n2+1)2 .
Proof. • By definition of fine-grained semantics, handle!(k(nx)x ) only happens when an interrupt is handled with c
(nx)
x in
protected mode.
• By definition of D ` · ↪→I ·, R(n1+1)1 = R(n2+1)2 = R0[pc 7→ isr ].
• Since unprotected memory cannot be changed by protected mode actions without causing a violation (that would cause
the observation of a jmpOut!(·; ·)) and is not changed upon RETI when it happens in a configuration with backup different
from ⊥ (cf. rules (CPU-RETI-*)), M(n1+1)1 U=M(n2+1)2 .
• Since we observe handle!(k(nx)x ) it must be that GIE = 1 and it had to be such also in c
(0)
x (because by definition the
operations on registers cannot modified this flag in protected mode). Hence, tiax = ⊥ for 0 ≤ i ≤ nx. Let tinta1 and tinta2 be
the arrival times of the interrupt that originated the observations handle!(k(n1)1 ) and handle!(k
(n2)
2 ), resp. By definition
of D ` ·y·D ·, tinta1 and tinta2 are the first absolute times after t(n1)1 and t(n2)2 in which an interrupt was raised and, since
D is deterministic and t(i)ax = ⊥ for 0 ≤ i ≤ nx, it must be that tinta1 = tinta2 = tint (recall that c(0)1
U≈ c(0)2 and that IN or
OUT instructions are forbidden in protected mode).
Assume now that the instruction during which the interrupt occurred ended at time tfx. Then we can write t
(nx+1) as:
t(nx+1) = t(nx) + k(nx)x = t
(nx) + tint − t(nx) + tfx − tint︸ ︷︷ ︸
Duration of the instruction
+ MAX_TIME− tfx + tint︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mitigation from (INT-PM-P)
+6
= t(nx) + tint −t(nx) +tfx −tint + MAX_TIME−tfx +tint + 6
= tint + MAX_TIME + 6
and therefore t(n1+1) = t(n2+1).
• Since t(n1+1) = t(n2+1), c(0)1
U≈ c(0)2 and no interaction with D via INor OUTcan occur in protected mode, the deterministic
device D performed the same number of steps in both computations, and then t(n1+1)a1 = t(n2+1)a2 and δ(n1+1)1 = δ(n2+1)2 .
Hence, c(n1+1)1
U≈ c(n2+1)2 as requested.
The following properties show that the combination of U -equivalence and trace equivalence induces some useful properties
of modules and sequences of complete interrupt segments. Before doing that we define the (a, n)-interrupt-limited version of
a context C as the context that behaves as C but such that (i) the transition relation of its device results from unrolling at
most n steps of its transition relation and (ii) its device never raises interrupts after observing the sequence of actions a:
Definition III.11. Let D = 〈∆, δinit, a;D〉 be an I/O device. Let a be a string over the signature A of I/O devices and denote
` as the function that associates to each string over A a unique natural number (e.g., its position in a suitable lexicographic
order). Given a context C = 〈MC ,D〉, we define its corresponding (a, n)-interrupt-limited context as C≤a,n = 〈MC ,D≤a,n〉
where D≤a,n = 〈img( a;D≤a,n) ∪ dom( a;D≤a,n), 0, a;D≤a,n〉 and
a
;D≤a,n , {(p, a, p′) | ∀a′. p = `(a′) ∧ p′ = `(a′ · a) ∧ δinit a
′
;∗D δ
a
;D δ
′ ∧ |a′ · a| ≤ n} \
{(p, int?, p′) | ∀a′. p = `(a · a′) ∧ p′ = `(a · a′ · int?)} ∪
{(p, , p′) | ∀a′. p = `(a · a′) ∧ p′ = `(a · a′ · int?) ∧ δinit a·a
′
;∗ D δ
int?
; D δ
′ ∧ |a · a′ · int?| ≤ n}.
(Note that any (a, n)-interrupt-limited context is actually a device, due to the constraint on its transition function).
Now, let
αx ∈{ε}∪
{α(0)x · · ·α(nx−1)x | nx ≥ 1 ∧ α(nx−1)x = reti?(k(nx−1)x )∧
∀i. 0 ≤ i ≤ nx − 1. α(i)x /∈ {•, jmpIn?(R(i)x ), jmpOut!(k(i)x ;R(i)x )}}.
Property III.17. If
• MM T=MM ′
• D ` INITC[MM ]
β·jmpIn?(R)
=========⇒ ∗ c(0)1
• D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β·jmpIn?(R)
=========⇒ ∗ c(0)2
• c(0)1
U≈ c(0)2
• for some m1 ≥ 0, D ` c(0)1
α1·τ(k(n1)1 )···τ(k
(n1+m1−1)
1 )·jmpOut!(k
(n1+m1)
1 ;R′)==================================⇒∗ c(n1+m1+1)1
• for some m2 ≥ 0, D ` c(0)2
α2·τ(k(n2)2 )···τ(k
(n2+m2−1)
2 )·jmpOut!(k
(n2+m2)
2 ;R′)==================================⇒∗ c(n2+m2+1)2
then
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) =
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ).
Proof. We show this property by contraposition. Indeed, we show that if
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) 6=
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ) then MM
T
6=
MM ′ . For that it suffices to show that
∃C ′.D′ ` INITC′[MM ]
β·jmpIn?(R)
=========⇒ ∗ c(0)3
jmpOut!(∆t3;R(n3+m3)3 )================⇒ c(n3+m3+1)3
(i.e., D ` c(0)3
α3·τ(k(n3)3 )···τ(k
(n3+m3−1)
3 )·jmpOut!(k
(n3+m3)
3 ;R
(n3+m3)
3 )=======================================⇒∗ c(n3+m3+1)3 )
such that
∀C ′′.D′′ ` INITC′′[MM′ ]
β·jmpIn?(R)
=========⇒ ∗ c(0)4
jmpOut!(∆t4;R(n4+m4+1)4 )==================⇒ c(n4+m4+1)4 with ∆t3 6= ∆t4
(i.e., D ` c(0)4
α4·τ(k(n4)4 )···τ(k
(n4+m4−1)
4 )·jmpOut!(k
(n4+m4)
4 ;R
(n4+m4)
4 )=======================================⇒∗ c(n4+m4+1)4 ).
Assume wlog that
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) <
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ). Noting that the first observable of β · jmpIn?(R) must be a
jmpIn?(·), by Properties III.10 and III.11, we have that c(0)1
P≈ c(0)3 and, similarly, c(0)2
P≈ c(0)4 . Thus, as a consequence
of Properties III.3, III.9 and III.8,
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) =
∑n3+m3
i=0 γ(c
(i)
3 ) and
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ) =
∑n4+m4
i=0 γ(c
(i)
4 ).
Let n ∈ N be greater than the number of steps over the relation ·;D in the computation D ` INITC[MM ] →∗ c(n1+m1+1)1
and let a be the sequence of actions over ·;D in the computation D ` INITC[MM ] →∗ c(0)1 . Choosing C ′ = C≤a,n we
get ∆t3 =
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) =
∑n3+m3
i=0 γ(c
(i)
3 ). Any other context C
′′ that allows to observe the same β · jmpIn?(R) from
INITC′′[MM′ ] raises 0 or more interrupts “after” c
0
4, hence taking additional S ≥ 0 cycles on top of those required for the
instructions to be executed. Thus MM
T
6= MM ′ , since
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) <
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ) and
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) = ∆t3 <
∆t4 =
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ) + S.
Property III.18. If
• D ` INITC[MM ]
β·jmpIn?(R)
=========⇒ ∗ c(0)1
• D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β
′·jmpIn?(R)
==========⇒ ∗ c(0)2
• c(0)1
U≈ c(0)2
• D ` c(0)1
α1·τ(k(n1)1 )···τ(k
(n1+m1−1)
1 )·α1======================⇒∗ c(n1+m1+1)1 for some m1 ≥ 0 and α1 ∈ {jmpOut!(k(n1+m1)1 ;R′),
handle!(k
(n1+m1)
1 )}
• D ` c(0)2
α2·τ(k(n2)2 )···τ(k
(n2+m2−1)
2 )·α2======================⇒∗ c(n2+m2+1)2 for some m2 ≥ 0 and α2 ∈ {jmpOut!(k(n2+m2)2 ;R′),
handle!(k
(n2+m2)
2 )}
then
1) |Iα1 | = |Iα2 |
2) c(n1)1
U≈ c(n2)2 .
Proof. Assume wlog that
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) ≤
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ), and we prove by induction on |Iα1 | that
D ` c(0)1 α1===⇒∗ c(n1)1 ∧ D ` c(0)2 α2===⇒∗ c(n2)1 imply c(n1)1
U≈ c(n2)2 ∧ |Iα1 | = |Iα2 |
• Case |Iα1 | = 0. Since no complete interrupt segment was observed it means that α1 cannot end with a reti?(·), so it
must be α1 = ε. Moreover, since c
(0)
1
U≈ c(0)2 and the value of the GIE bit cannot be changed in protected mode, we know
that:
– Case R(0)1 [sr.GIE] = R(0)2 [sr.GIE] = 0. Then no handle!(·) can be observed in α2, hence it must be that α2 = ε and
the two thesis easily follow.
– Case R(0)1 [sr.GIE] = R(0)2 [sr.GIE] = 1. Then it means that no interrupt was raised by the device in the computation
starting with c(0)1 and the same must happen in c
(0)
2 because of U -equivalence and
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) ≤
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ).
Hence it must be that α2 = ε and the two thesis easily follow.
• Case |Iα1 | = |Iα′1 |+ 1. If
D ` c(0)1
α′1===⇒∗ c(n′1)1 ∧ D ` c(0)2
α′2===⇒∗ c(n′2)2 imply c(n
′
1)
1
U≈ c(n′2)2 ∧ |Iα′1 | = |Iα′2 | (IHP)
then
D ` c(0)1 α1===⇒∗ c(n1)1 ∧ D ` c(0)2 α2===⇒∗ c(n2)2 imply c(n1)1
U≈ c(n2)2 ∧ |Iα1 | = |Iα2 |
Now let (i1, j1) be the new interrupt segment of α1, that we split as follows:
α1 = α
′
1 · τ(k(n
′
1)
1 ) · · · τ(k(i1−1)1 ) · handle!(k(i1)1 ) · · · reti?(k(j1)1 ).
Since by (IHP) c(n
′
1)
1
U≈ c(n′2)2 and D is deterministic and no successfully I/O ever happens in protected mode, the first
new interrupt (i.e. the one leading to the observation of handle!(k(i1)1 )) is raised at the same cycle in both computations.
Call c(i2)2 the configuration at the beginning of the step of computation in which such interrupt was raised (the choice of
indexes will be clear below). From this configuration only three cases for the fine-grained action might be observed:
– Case τ(·) and jmpOut!(·; ·). Never happens, since B(i2+1)2 6= ⊥.
– Case handle!(k(i2)2 ). Property III.16 ensures that c
(i2+1)
2
U≈ c(i1+1)1 , and Property III.15 that at some index j2 a
reti?(k
(j2)
2 ) is observed in α2, i.e., a new interrupt segment (i2, j2) is observed. Thus, |Iα2 | = |Iα′2 |+ 1 = |Iα′1 |+ 1 =|Iα1 | (where the second equality holds by (IHP)). Finally, by definition of α2, we have that n1 = j1 +1 and n2 = j2 +2,
hence c(n1)1
U≈ c(n2)2 .
The following property states that U -equivalent unprotected-mode configurations perform the same single coarse-grained
action:
Property III.19. If c1
U≈ c2, c1 `mode UM and D ` c1 β==⇒ c′1, then D ` c2 β==⇒ c′2 and c′1
U≈ c′2.
Proof. Since c1 `mode UM, the segment of fine-grained trace that originated β (see Figure 14) is in the form:
D ` c1 ξ···ξ·α======⇒∗ c′1
with either α = • or α = jmpIn?(R).
Property III.15 guarantees that:
D ` c2 ξ···ξ·α======⇒∗ c′2 ∧ c′1
U≈ c′2.
Thus, D ` c2 β==⇒ c′2 and c′1
U≈ c′2.
Finally, we can show that U -equivalence is preserved by coarse-grained traces:
Property III.20. If c1
U≈ c2, c1 `mode UM, D ` c1 β==⇒ ∗ c′1, D ` c2 β==⇒ ∗ c′2, c′1 `mode UM and c′2 `mode UM then c′1
U≈ c′2.
Proof. We show the property by induction on n, the length of β:
• Case n = 0. By definition of ε==⇒ ∗ we know that it must be c′1 = c1 and c′2 = c′2 and the thesis easily follows.
• Case n = n′ + 1. The only case in which a coarse-grained trace can be extended by just one action, while remaining
in unprotected mode, is when the action is •. In this case the hypothesis easily follows from the definition of • and
U -equivalence.
• Case n = n′ + 2. If
D ` c1 β==⇒ ∗ c′′1 ∧ D ` c2 β==⇒ ∗ c′′2 ∧ R′′1 [pc] `mode UM ∧ R′′2 [pc] `mode UM imply c′′1
U≈ c′′2
then
D ` c1 β==⇒ ∗ c′′1 ββ
′
====⇒ c′1 ∧ D ` c2 β==⇒ ∗ c′′2 ββ
′
====⇒ c′2 ∧ R′1[pc] `mode UM ∧ R′2[pc] `mode UM imply c′1
U≈ c′2.
By cases on ββ′:
– Case ββ′ = jmpIn?(R) •. Directly follows from definition of • and U≈.
– Case ββ′ = jmpIn?(R) jmpOut!(∆t;R′). By definition they are originated by
D ` c′′1
ξ···ξ·jmpIn?(R)
===========⇒∗ c(0)1
α
(0)
1 ··· α
(n1−1)
1============⇒∗ c(n1)1
jmpOut!(k
(n1)
1 ;R′)=============⇒ c′1
D ` c′′2
ξ···ξ·jmpIn?(R)
===========⇒∗ c(0)2
α
(0)
2 ··· α
(n2−1)
2============⇒∗ c(n2)2
jmpOut!(k
(n2)
2 ;R′)=============⇒ c′2.
By (IHP) and by Property III.15 we can conclude that c(0)1
U≈ c(0)2 .
Let c(Mx)x be the configuration generated by the last reti?(·) in α(0)x · · · α(nx−1)x . By Property III.18 the number of
completely handled interrupts is the same in the two traces and c(M1)1
U≈ c(M2)2 . Also:
∗ By definition of jmpOut!(k(n1)1 ;R′) and jmpOut!(k(n2)2 ;R′) we trivially get R′1 = R′2 = R′.
∗ Since unprotected memory cannot be changed in protected mode (see Table IV) and c(M1)1
U≈ c(M2)2 , M′1 U=M′2.
∗ Let αx = α(0)x · · · α(nx−1)x · jmpOut!(k(nx)x ;R′). By definition of β = jmpOut!(∆t;R′):
t′1 = t
(0)
1 + ∆t+
∑
(i1,j1)∈|Iα1 |
(t
(j1)
1 − t(i1+1)1 )
t′2 = t
(0)
2 + ∆t+
∑
(i2,j2)∈|Iα2 |
(t
(j2)
2 − t(i2+1)2 )
But t(0)1 = t
(0)
2 since c
(0)
1
U≈ c(0)2 . Also, each operand in (t(j1)1 − t(i1+1)1 ) equals the corresponding (t(j2)2 − t(i2+1)2 )
because for each (pth element) (i1, j1) ∈ Iα1 and corresponding (i2, j2) ∈ Iα2 , Property III.16 guarantees that
t
(i1+1)
1 = t
(i2+1)
2 and Property III.15 guarantees that t
(j1)
1 = t
(j2)
2 .
∗ Finally, since no interaction with D via INor OUToccurs in protected mode and since the same deterministic device
performed the same number of steps (starting from c(0)1
U≈ c(0)2 ), it follows that t′a1 = t′a2 and δ′1 = δ′2.
4) Proof of preservation: Before proving the preservation and reflection of contextual equivalence, we prove the following
facts about the trace semantics:
Proposition III.1. C[MM ]⇓L iff ∃β. D ` INITC[MM ]
β·•
====⇒ ∗ HALT.
Proof. We split the proof in the two directions:
• Case ⇒. By definition of C[MM ]⇓L, we know that D ` INITC[MM ] →∗ HALT. Thus, definition of fine-grained and
coarse-grained traces (Figures 13 and 14) guarantee that the last observed action is • as requested.
• Case ⇐. Trivial.
Proposition III.2. Let C = 〈MC ,D〉. If D ` INITC[MM ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c1 and D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c2, then c1 `mode m and
c2 `mode m.
Proof. Let β the last observable of β. By definition c1 and c2 are such that, for some c′1 and c
′
2:
D ` c′1 α===⇒ c1 D ` c′2 α===⇒ c2
with α equal to •, jmpIn?(·) or jmpOut!(·; ·) (depending on the value of β). In either case, since c′1 and c′1 are the configuration
right after α and by definition of fine-grained traces, we have c1 `mode m and c2 `mode m.
Proposition III.3. For any context C = 〈MC ,D〉 and module MM , if D ` INITC[MM ]
β0 ··· βn
=======⇒ ∗ c with n ≥ 0, then:
(i) Observables in even positions (β0, β2, . . . ) in traces are either • or jmpIn?(R) (for some R)
(ii) Observables in odd positions (β1, β3, . . . ) in traces are either • or jmpOut!(∆t;R) (for some ∆t and R)
Proof. Both easily follow from Figures 13 and 14.
a) Reflection of 'L at SancusL.: In this section we prove the implication (i) of Figure 12, i.e., thatMM T=MM ′ =⇒
MM 'LMM ′ .
First, we show that, due to the mitigation, the behavior of the context does not depend on the behavior of the module:
Lemma III.4. Let C = 〈MC ,D〉. If D ` INITC[MM ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c1 β==⇒ c′1, D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c2, c1 `mode UM and
c2 `mode UM, then D ` c2 β==⇒ c′2.
Proof. First, observe that INITC[MM ]
U≈ INITC[MM′ ], because
INITC[MM ] = 〈δinit, 0,⊥,MC unionmultiMM ,RinitMC , 0xFFFE,⊥〉
INITC[MM′ ] = 〈δinit, 0,⊥,MC unionmultiMM ′ ,RinitMC , 0xFFFE,⊥〉.
Since INITC[MM ] `mode UM, INITC[MM ]
U≈ INITC[MM′ ], D ` INITC[MM ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c1, D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c2, c1 `mode
UM and c2 `mode UM, by Property III.20 we have c1 U≈ c2. Finally, since D ` c1 β==⇒ c′1 and by Property III.19 we get
D ` c2 β==⇒ c′2.
Then the following lemma shows that the isolation mechanism offered by the enclave guarantees that the behavior of the
module is not influenced by the one of the context:
Lemma III.5. Let C = 〈MC ,D〉.
If MM T= MM ′ , D ` INITC[MM ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c′′1
jmpIn?(R1)
=========⇒ c1 β==⇒ c′1, D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c′′2
jmpIn?(R2)
=========⇒ c2, then D `
c2
β
==⇒ c′2.
Proof. Noting that c1 `mode PM and that the last observable of β is a jmpIn?(·), by definition of coarse-grained traces (see
Figure 14) we have the following fine-grained traces starting from c′′1 :
D ` c′′1
ξ ··· ξ·jmpIn?(R1)
=============⇒∗ c1 α1===⇒∗ c(n1)1
τ(k
(n1)
1 ) ··· τ(k
(n1+m1−1)
1 )·α′1=====================⇒∗ c′1
with α′1 ∈ {jmpOut!(k1;R′1), handle!(k1) · ξ · · · ξ · •}.
Similarly for c2 it must be:
D ` c′′2
ξ ··· ξ·jmpIn?(R2)
=============⇒∗ c2 α2===⇒∗ c(n2)2
τ(k
(n2)
2 ) ··· τ(k
(n2+m2−1)
1 )·α′2=====================⇒∗ c′2.
with α′2 ∈ {jmpOut!(k2;R′2), handle!(k2) · ξ · · · ξ · •}.
We have now two cases:
• Case β = jmpOut!(∆t;R). MM T= MM ′ implies the existence of a context C ′ = 〈MC′ ,D′〉 that allow us to observe
D′ ` INITC′[MM′ ]
β
==⇒ c3 β==⇒ c′3, i.e.
D′ ` c3 α3===⇒∗ c(n3)3
τ(k
(n3)
3 ) ··· τ(k
(n3+m3−1)
3 )·α′3=====================⇒ c′3
with α′3 ∈ {jmpOut!(k3;R′3), handle!(k3) · ξ · · · ξ · •}.
By Properties III.10 and III.11 we have that c2
P≈ c3, and by Property III.9 we can conclude that c(n3)3
P≈ c(n2)2 .
Property III.8 guarantees that
τ(k
(n2)
2 ) · · · τ(k(n2+m2−1)2 ) · α′2 = τ(k(n3)3 ) · · · τ(k(n3+m3−1)3 ) · α′3.
Since α′2 = α
′
3 = jmpOut!(k3;R1), we know that D ` c(n2)2
jmpOut!(∆t′;R1)
============⇒ c′2.
By Property III.1, we have
∆t =
n1+m1∑
i=0
γ(c
(i)
1 ) + (11 + MAX_TIME) · |Iα1 |
∆t′ =
n2+m2∑
i=0
γ(c
(i)
2 ) + (11 + MAX_TIME) · |Iα2 |.
Since by Properties III.17 and III.18 we have
∑n1+m1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) =
∑n2+m2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ) and |Iα1 | = |Iα2 |, we get ∆t = ∆t′ as
requested.
• Case β = •. Then it must be that α′1 = handle!(k1) · ξ · · · ξ · • and α′2 = handle!(k2) · ξ · · · ξ · •. If this was not the case
(i.e., if α′2 = jmpOut!(k2;R′2)), then c2 could be swapped with c1 (and c1 with c2) in the the statement of this Lemma
and the previous case would apply. Thus, the thesis follows.
From the previous two lemmata we can then show the following:
Lemma III.6. Given a context C = 〈MC ,D〉 and two modulesMM andMM ′ . IfMM T=MM ′ and D ` INITC[MM ]
β
==⇒ ∗
c1, then D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c2.
Proof. We can show this by induction on the length n of β.
• n = 0. Since β = ε, by definition of ·==⇒ ∗, we have c1 = INITC[MM ] = c1. Again, by definition of ·==⇒ ∗, we can choose
c2 = INITC[MM′ ] and get the thesis.
• n = n′ + 1. The induction hypothesis (IHP) is then:
D ` INITC[MM ]
β
′
===⇒ ∗ c′1 ⇒ D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β
′
===⇒ ∗ c′2
and we must show that
D ` INITC[MM ]
β
′
===⇒ ∗ c′1 β==⇒ c1 ⇒ D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β
′
===⇒ ∗ c′2 β==⇒ c2
By cases on the CPU mode in c′1 and c
′
2:
– Case R′1[pc] `mode UM and R′2[pc] `mode UM: Follows by (IHP) and Lemma III.4.
– Case R′1[pc] `mode PM and R′2[pc] `mode PM: Follows by (IHP) and Lemma III.5.
– Case R′1[pc] `mode m and R′2[pc] `mode m′ and m 6= m′: It never happens, as observed in Proposition III.2.
Finally we can prove that (i) from Figure 12 holds, i.e., that if two modules are trace equivalent then they are contextually
equivalent in SancusL:
Lemma III.7. If MM T=MM ′ then MM 'LMM ′ .
Proof. Expanding the definition of 'L, the statement becomes:
MM T=MM ′ ⇒ (∀C = 〈MC ,D〉.C[MM ]⇓L ⇐⇒ C[MM ′ ]⇓L)
We split the double implication and we show the two cases independently.
• Case ⇒, i.e., MM T= MM ′ ⇒ (∀C.C[MM ]⇓L ⇒ C[MM ′ ]⇓L). By Proposition III.1 there exists β such that D `
INITC[MM ]
β·•
====⇒ ∗ HALT.
Since MM T=MM ′ , we know by Lemma III.6 that D ` INITC[MM′ ]
β·•
====⇒ ∗ HALT. Thus, again by Proposition III.1,
we have C[MM ′ ]⇓L.
• Case ⇐, i.e., MM T=MM ′ =⇒ (∀C.C[MM ]⇓L ⇐ C[MM ′ ]⇓L), symmetric to the previous one.
b) Preservation of 'H at SancusH.: In this section we prove the implications (ii) - and consequently (iii) - of Figure 12,
i.e., that MM 'HMM ′ =⇒ MM T=MM ′ and MM 'HMM ′ =⇒ MM 'LMM ′ .
For that, we first give a formal definition of distinguishing traces for a pair of modules. Then we give two algorithms that
start from two distinguishing traces, their corresponding modules and the distinguishing context in SancusL build a memory
and a device that, put together as a context, differentiate the two modules in SancusH.
Definition III.12 (Distinguishing traces). Let MM and MM ′ be two modules. We call β = βs · β · βe ∈ Tr(MM ) and
β
′
= βs · β′ · β
′
e ∈ Tr(MM ′) distinguishing traces for MM and MM ′ if β 6= β′, β /∈ Tr(MM ′), β
′
/∈ Tr(MM ) and they
are observed under the same context CL, i.e, DL ` INITCL[MM ]
β
==⇒ ∗ c and DL ` INITCL[MM′ ]
β
′
===⇒ ∗ c′, for some c, c′.
From now onwards, for simplicity, we write β = ε (resp. β′ = ε) if β (resp. β
′
) is shorter than β
′
(resp. β).
Property III.21. If MM and MM ′ are two modules such that MM 6'L MM ′ , then there always exist β and β′ that are
distinguishing traces for MM and MM ′ .
Proof. From the contrapositive of Lemma III.7 we know thatMM
T
6=MM ′ , i.e., there exist β ∈ Tr(MM ) and β′ ∈ Tr(MM ′)
such that β /∈ Tr(MM ′) and β ∈ Tr(MM ). Also, since MM 6'L MM ′ , we have that there exists a context CL such that
CL[MM ]⇓L and CL[MM ′ ] 6⇓L (or vice versa) — assume wlog CL[MM ]⇓L and CL[MM ′ ]6⇓L.
Thus, by Proposition III.1:
DL ` INITCL[MM ]
β
′′
===⇒ ∗ HALT
DL ` INITCL[MM′ ]
β
′′′
====⇒ ∗ c 6= HALT
for some β
′′
(ending in •), c and for all β′′′ that can be observed.
Indeed, we can always write that β
′′
= βs · β · βe and β
′′′
= βs · β′ · β
′
e where:
• βs is the longest (possibly empty) common prefix of the two traces
• β and β′ 6= • are the first different observables – one of the two may be ε or, by Proposition III.1, it may be β = •
• βe and β
′
e are the (possibly empty) remainders of the two traces
Thus, since β
′′
and β
′′′
are also observed under the same context CL, they are distinguishing traces.
c) First algorithm: memory initialization.: The pseudo-code in Algorithm 1 describes how to build the memory of
the distinguishing context starting from two distinguishing traces for the modules, β = βs · β · βe and β
′
= βs · β′ · β
′
e
(cf. Definition III.12). Throughout the algorithm we assume as given an assembler function encode that takes an assembly
instruction as input and returns its encoding as one or two words – according to the size specified by Table III. Also, we
assume that there is enough space in the unprotected memory to contain the context code: we do not lack generality since the
required space for the code is bounded by a constant (≤ 25 words) plus the number of different addresses which the protected
code jumps to (that must be part of the unprotected memory anyway). Moreover, the algorithm uses five constants: each of
them represents an unprotected memory address assumed different from (i) each other, (ii) 0xFFFE and (iii) any address
R[pc] such that jmpOut!(∆t;R) belongs to one of the input distinguishing traces. For simplicity, assume that no jumps to
0xFFFE are performed by the modules. Note that this limitation is easily lifted by changing Algorithm 1 a bit: upon the jump
into protected mode right before the said jump to 0xFFFE the context has to write the right code to deal with it in 0xFFFE
and, afterwards, restore the old content of such an address.
Intuitively, the algorithm first initializes the memory of the context MC by filling it with the code in Figure 15. Then, if β
and β′ differ because they are both jmpOut!(·; ·) but with different registers, two cases arise:
• If the register differentiating β and β′ is r 6= pc, then, starting at address A_RDIFF, add the code to request a new program
counter (that will depend on the value of r) to the device;
1 A_HALT. HLT
2
3 A_LOOP. JMP pc
4
5 A_JIN . IN sp
6 . IN sr
7 . IN R3
8 . IN R4
9 . IN R5
10 . IN R6
11 . IN R7
12 . IN R8
13 . IN R9
14 . IN R10
15 . IN R11
16 . IN R12
17 . IN R13
18 . IN R14
19 . IN R15
20 . IN pc
21
22 A_EP . OUT pc
23 . IN pc
24
25 0xFFFE. A_EP
26
Figure 15: Initial content of unprotected memory as used by Algorithm 1.
• Otherwise, add the code to request the new program counter at the addresses to which each of the modules jumps (call
those addresses joutd and joutd ′).
The algorithm then adds the code to deal with jumps out from the protected module to unprotected code for any
jmpOut!(∆t;R) in βs such that R[pc] 6= joutd and R[pc] 6= joutd′. Finally, the algorithm returns the memory built
and the values of joutd and joutd ′ (to be used afterwards).
Algorithm 1 Builds the memory of the distinguishing context.
1: procedure BUILDMEM(β = βs · β · βe, β
′
= βs · β′ · β
′
e)
2: . β and β
′
are distinguishing traces w. common prefix βs
3: joutd = joutd ′ = ⊥
4: MC = filled as described in Figure 15
5: if β = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′ = jmpOut!(∆t;R′) ∧ (∃r.R[r] 6= R′[r]) then
6: if r 6= pc then
7: MC =MC [A_RDIFF 7→ encode(OUT r), A_RDIFF + 1 7→ encode(IN pc)]
8: else
9: joutd = R[pc]
10: joutd ′ = R′[pc]
11: MC =MC [joutd 7→ encode(OUT pc), joutd + 1 7→ encode(IN pc)]
12: MC =MC [joutd ′ 7→ encode(OUT pc), joutd ′ + 1 7→ encode(IN pc)]
13: end if
14: end if
15: for jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∈ βs do
16: if R[pc] 6= joutd ∧R[pc] 6= joutd ′ then
17: MC =MC [R[pc] 7→ encode(IN pc)]
18: end if
19: end for
20: return (MC , joutd , joutd ′)
21: end procedure
d) Second algorithm: device construction.: This second algorithm iteratively builds a device that cooperates with the
memory of the context given by Algorithm 1 to distinguish MM from MM ′ .
The first two parameters of BUILDDEVICE – joutd and joutd ′ – are differentiating jmpOut!(·; ·) addresses (if any), as
returned by the BUILDMEM (Algorithm 1). Parameters β and β
′
are distinguishing traces forMM andMM ′ generated under
the context CL (cf. Definition III.12). Finally, term (resp. term ′) denotes whether MM (resp. MM ′ ) converges in a context
with no interrupts after the last jump into protected mode.
Algorithm 2 Builds the device of the distinguishing context.
1: procedure BUILDDEVICE(joutd , joutd ′, β = β0 · · ·βn−1 · β · βe, β
′
= β0 · · ·βn−1 · β′ · β′e, term, term ′, CL)
2: . joutd , joutd ′ are differentiating jmpOut!(·; ·) addresses, if any
3: . β and β
′
are distinguishing traces generated by the context CL
4: . term (resp. term ′) denotes whether MM (resp. MM ′ ) converges in a context with no interrupts after the last
jump into protected mode
5: ∆ = {0}
6:
·
;D = ∅
7: δL = 0 . This variable keeps track of the last added device state.
8: for i ∈ 0..n− 1 do
9: if βi = jmpIn?(R) then
10: ∆ = ∆ ∪ {δL + 1, . . . , δL + 17}
11:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, wr(w), δL) | w ∈Word}
12:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, rd(A_JIN), δL + 1)}
13:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 1, rd(R[sp]), δL + 2)}
14:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 2, rd(R[sr]), δL + 3)}
15:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + i, rd(R[i]), δL + i+ 1) | 3 ≤ i ≤ 15}
16:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 16, rd(R[pc]), δL + 17)}
17:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + i, , δL + i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ 16}
18: δL = δL + 17
19: else if βi = jmpOut!(∆t;R) then
20:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, , δL)} ∪ {(δL, wr(w), δL) | w ∈Word}
21: end if
22: end for
23: if β = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′ = jmpOut!(∆t′;R′) ∧ (∃r.R[r] 6= R′[r]) then
24: if r 6= pc then
25: ∆ = ∆ ∪ {δL + 1, . . . , δL + 4}
26:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, rd(A_RDIFF), δL + 1)}
27:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 1, wr(R[pc]), δL + 2)}
28:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 1, wr(R′[pc]), δL + 3)}
29:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 2, rd(A_HALT), δL + 4)}
30:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 3, rd(A_LOOP), δL + 4)}
31:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + i, , δL + i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ 3}
32: δL = δL + 4
33: else
34: ∆ = ∆ ∪ {δL + 1, . . . , δL + 3}
35:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, wr(joutd), δL + 1)}
36:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, wr(joutd ′), δL + 2)}
37:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 1, rd(A_HALT), δL + 3)}
38:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 2, rd(A_LOOP), δL + 3)}
39:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + i, , δL + i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ 2}
40: δL = δL + 3
41: end if
42: continues ...
The first two lines define the initial set of states, which will be a finite subset of N in the end, and the initial empty transition
function.
Line 7 defines δL that records the last state that was added to the I/O device. At the beginning it is initialized to 0.
The algorithm then proceeds by iterating over all the observables in βs (all the steps below also update ∆ and δL, but we
omit to state it explicitly):
• Case βi = β′i = jmpIn?(R). In this case we know that either this is the first observable or previous one was a jmpOut!(·; ·).
Since the memory is obtained following Algorithm 1, we know that in both cases we reach the instruction IN pc (either at
43: ... continued
44: else if β = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′ = jmpOut!(∆t′;R) ∧∆t 6= ∆t′ then
45: . Let DL ` INITC[MM ]
βs===⇒ ∗ c1 and DL6 I ` c1 jmpOut!(∆t6 I ;R)===========⇒ c′1.
46: . Let DL ` INITC[MM′ ]
βs===⇒ ∗ c2 and DL6 I ` c2 jmpOut!(∆t
′6 I ;R)
============⇒ c′2.
47: i = t′1 − t1
48: i′ = t′2 − t2
49: ∆ = ∆ ∪ {δL + 1, . . . , δL + max (i, i′) + 1}
50:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + min(i, i′), rd(A_HALT), δL + max (i, i′) + 1)}
51:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + max (i, i′), rd(A_LOOP), δL + max (i, i′) + 1))}
52:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + k, , δL + k + 1) | 0 ≤ k ≤ max (i, i′)}
53: δL = δL + max (i, i
′) + 1
54: else if β = • ∧ β′ = jmpOut!(∆t;R) then
55: if term then
56: ∆ = ∆ ∪ {δL + 1, . . . , δL + 2}
57:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, wr(A_EP), δL + 1)}
58:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + 1, rd(A_HALT), δL + 2)}
59:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, rd(A_LOOP), δL + 2)}
60:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, wr(w), δL) | w ∈Word \ {A_EP}}
61:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL + i, , δL + i) | 0 ≤ i ≤ 1}
62: δL = δL + 2
63: else
64: ∆ = ∆ ∪ {δL + 1}
65:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, rd(A_HALT), δL + 1)}
66:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, wr(w), δL) | w ∈Word}
67:
·
;D =
·
;D ∪{(δL, , δL)}
68: δL = δL + 2
69: end if
70: else if β = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′ = ε then
71: . As the previous case, with term ′ in place of term .
72: else
73: return ⊥
74: end if
75: D = 〈∆, 0, ·;D〉 . As above, assume to have a sink state where all undefined actions lead to.
76: return D
77: end procedure
address A_EP or those of jumps out of protected mode), waiting for the next program counter (sometimes before that we
perform a write, which shall be ignored). Thus, the device ignores any write operation and replies with A_JIN (line 12).
Then it starts to send the values of the registers in R, so to simulate in SancusH what happens in SancusL and to match
the requests from the code. To help the intuition Figure 16a depicts how the transition function looks after the update
(the solid black state denotes the new value of δL).
• Case βi = β′i = jmpOut!(∆t;R). The device is simply updated with a loop on δL with action  and ignores any write
operation (so as to deal with R[pc] = joutd or R[pc] = joutd ′). Figure 16b pictorially represents this case.
Then, when βs ends, the algorithm analyses β and β
′ and sets up the device to differentiate the two modules:
• Case β = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′ = jmpOut!(∆t′;R′) ∧ (∃r.R[r] 6= R′[r]). In this case the differentiation is due to a
register, and two further sub-cases may arise, depending on whether it is pc. If the register is pc then the device waits
for the differentiating value for the context (that is executing code at joutd and joutd ′ by construction) and based on that
value, it replies with either A_HALT (line 37) or A_LOOP (line 38). Instead, if the differentiation register is not pc then
the code of the context is waiting for the next program counter and the context replies with A_RDIFF. From this address
we find the code that sends the differentiating register and, based on that value, the device replies with either A_HALT
(line 29) or A_LOOP (line 30). Figures 16c and 16d may help the intuition.
• Case β = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′ = jmpOut!(∆t′;R) ∧ ∆t 6= ∆t′. This case is probably the most interesting since
differentiation happens in SancusL due to timings. However, different timings in SancusL correspond to different
timings in SancusH (as observed in proof of Property III.23), and the device is programmed to reply with either A_HALT
(line 50) or A_LOOP (line 51) depending on the time value. Figure 16e intuitively depicts this situation.
• Case β = • ∧ β′ = jmpOut!(∆t;R). In this case • may occur during an interrupt service routine. We then have two
sub-cases, depending on whether the first module terminates when executed in a context with no interrupts after the last
jump into protected mode or not (i.e., encoded by the value of term). When term holds, the first module makes the
CPU go through an exception handling configuration that jumps to A_EP and the device instructs the code to jump to
A_HALT (line 58), while for the second module the CPU jumps to any other location (A_EP is chosen to be different from
any other jump out address!) and is instructed to jump to A_LOOP (line 59). When term does not hold, the first module
diverges, while for the second module the CPU jumps to a location in unprotected code and it is instructed to jump to
A_HALT (line 65). Figures 16f and 16g may help the intuition.
• Case β = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′ = ε. Analogous to the previous case.
• Otherwise. No other cases may arise, as noted in Property III.22.
Finally, the algorithm returns a device with the set of states ∆, the initial state 0 and the transition function built as just
explained.
The first property about BUILDDEVICE states that, under the right conditions, it always produces an actual I/O device:
Property III.22. Let MM
T
6=MM ′ , β, β′ be distinguishing traces of MM and MM ′ originated by some context CL and let
term and term ′ be any pair of booleans, then D = BUILDDEVICE(β, β′, joutd , joutd ′, term, term ′, CL) 6= ⊥ and D is an
I/O device.
Proof. We first show that BUILDDEVICE never returns ⊥ when β and β′ are distinguishing traces. For that, let β = βs ·β ·βe
and β
′
= βs · β′ · β
′
e, and note that the only cases for which ⊥ is returned are the following:
• Case β = β′ = •. Since β 6= β′ by hypothesis, this case never happens.
• Case β = jmpOut!(∆t;R) and β′ = jmpIn?(R′) (or vice versa). This case never happens due to Proposition III.3.
• Case {•, jmpIn?(R)} 3 β 6= β′ ∈ {•, jmpIn?(R′)}. Roughly, this means that the same context performed two different
actions upon observation of the same trace (βs). Formally, we know by hypothesis that for the context C
L = 〈MC ,DL〉
DL ` INITCL[MM ]
βs===⇒ ∗ c1
DL ` INITCL[MM′ ]
βs===⇒ ∗ c2.
with c1 `mode UM and c2 `mode UM. Property III.20 guarantees that c1 U≈ c2, thus by Property III.19 the same observable
must originate from both c1 and c2, but that is against the hypothesis that β 6= β′.
Finally, it is easy to see that D returned by BUILDDEVICE is an actual device. Indeed, its set of states ∆ is finite (the algorithm
always terminates in a finite number of steps and each step adds a finite number of state); its initial state 0 belongs to ∆;
since a sink state is assumed to exist, no int? transitions are ever added and a single rd(w) transition outgoes from any given
state: thus the transition relation respects the definition of I/O devices.
Before stating and proving the reflection itself, we need some further definitions and properties.
The following property states that the context built by joining together the results of the two algorithms above is a
distinguishing one:
Property III.23. Let MM
T
6=MM ′; let CL = 〈MC ,DL〉; let
DL ` INITCL[MM ]
βs===⇒ ∗ c′1 β==⇒ c1
DL ` INITCL[MM′ ]
βs===⇒ ∗ c′2 β
′
===⇒ c2
be such that β = βs · β · βe and β
′
= βs · β′ · βe distinguishing traces of MM and MM ′; and let
term ⇐⇒ DL6 I ` c′1 →∗ HALT
term ′ ⇐⇒ DL6 I ` c′2 →∗ HALT.
If (MC , joutd , joutd ′) = BUILDMEM(β, β′), D = BUILDDEVICE(β, β′, joutd , joutd ′, term, term ′) and CH = 〈MC ,D〉,
then CH [MM ]⇓H and CH [MM ′ ]6⇓H (or vice versa).
Proof. Assume wlog that CL[MM ]⇓L and CL[MM ′ ]6⇓L. By Lemma III.1
CH [MM ]⇓H ⇐⇒ CH6 I [MM ]⇓L and CH [MM ′ ]⇓H ⇐⇒ CH6 I [MM ′ ]⇓L
δL

wr(_)
    



   
rd(JIN) rd(R[sp]) rd(R[sr]) rd(R[R3]) rd(R[R4])
rd
(R
[R
5
])
rd(R[R6])rd(R[R7])rd(R[R8])rd(R[R9])rd(R[R10])
rd
(R
[R
1
1
])
rd(R[R12]) rd(R[R13]) rd(R[R14]) rd(R[R15]) rd(R[pc])
(a) The case of βi = β′i = jmpIn?(R).
δL

wr(_)
(b) The case of βi = β′i =
jmpOut!(∆t;R).
δL

 

rd(A_RDIFF) wr(R′[r])
w
r
(R
[r
])
rd(A_LOOP)
rd(
A_H
AL
T)
(c) The case of βi = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′i = jmpOut!(∆t′;R′) ∧ (∃r.R[r] 6=
R′[r]).
δL



wr(joutd)
w
r
(jo
u
td ′)
rd(A_LOOP)
rd(
A_H
AL
T)
(d) The case of βi = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′i =
jmpOut!(∆t′;R′) ∧R[pc] 6= R′[pc].
δL . . . . . .
   
rd(A_LOOP)
rd
(A_
H
A
L
T
)
min(i, i′) max(i, i′)−min(i, i′)
(e) The case of βi = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ β′i = jmpOut!(∆t′;R) ∧∆t 6= ∆t′. Let i and i′ as in Algorithm 2.
δL

wr(w), w 6= A_EP
wr(A_EP) rd(A_HALT)
rd(A_LOOP)
(f) The case of βi = • ∧ β′i = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ term .
δL

wr(_)
rd(A_HALT)
(g) The case of βi = • ∧ β′i = jmpOut!(∆t;R) ∧ ¬term .
Figure 16: Graphical representations of the updates performed by Algorithm 2 to the transition function of the device.
It suffices thus proving that CH6 I distinguishes MM and MM ′ , i.e., CH6 I [MM ]⇓L and CH6 I [MM ′ ] 6⇓L or vice versa.
We show by induction on the length 2n+ 1 of βs that if
DL ` INITCL[MM ]
βs===⇒ ∗ c′1
DL ` INITCL[MM′ ]
βs===⇒ ∗ c′2
then ∃β′s s.t.
DH6 I ` INITCH6 I [MM ]
β
′
s===⇒ ∗ c3 and
DH6 I ` INITCH6 I [MM′ ]
β
′
s===⇒ ∗ c4 with β′s ≈ βs (see Definition III.10).
Note that the length of βs must be odd as a consequence of Properties III.20 and III.19 and no • appears in it since otherwise
it would mean that β = β
′
.
• Case n = 0. Then, βs is jmpIn?(R). Thus, Algorithm 1 guarantees that the current instruction is IN pc (at address
A_EP) and its execution leads to address A_JIN (by Algorithm 2) and the same jmpIn?(R) is observed starting from both
INITCH6 I [MM ] and INITCH6 I [MM′ ] and also β
′
s ≈ βs.
• Case n = n′ + 1. If
DL ` INITCL[MM ]
β
′′
s===⇒ ∗ c′′1 ∧ DL ` INITCL[MM′ ]
β
′′
s===⇒ ∗ c′′′2
⇓
DH6 I ` INITCH6 I [MM ]
β
′′′
s====⇒ ∗ c′3 ∧DH6 I ` INITCH6 I [MM′ ]
β
′′′
s====⇒ ∗ c′4 ∧ β
′′′
s ≈ β
′′
s (IHP)
then
DL ` INITCL[MM ]
β
′′
s===⇒ ∗ c′′1 β
′′
===⇒ ∗ c′1 ∧ DL ` INITCL[MM′ ]
β
′′
===⇒ ∗ c′′2 β
′′
===⇒ ∗ c′2
⇓
DH6 I ` INITCH6 I [MM ]
β
′′′
s====⇒ ∗ c′3 β
′′′
====⇒ ∗ c3 ∧DH6 I ` INITCH6 I [MM′ ]
β
′′′
s====⇒ ∗ c′4 β
′′′
====⇒ ∗ c4 ∧ β′′′s · β
′′′ ≈ β′′s · β
′′
.
Note that it must be that β
′′
= jmpOut!(∆t;R) · jmpIn?(R′) by Proposition III.3 and because we never observe • in the
common prefix. By (IHP) and Property III.11 we have c′′1
P≈ c′3 and c′′2
P≈ c′4. Thus, by Properties III.9 and III.8, it must
be that jmpOut!(∆t′;R) is observed when starting in c′3 and jmpOut!(∆t′′;R) is observed when starting in c′4 (for some
∆t′ and ∆t′′).
By definition of coarse-grained traces, each of the computations above is generated by fine-grained trace in the form (we
write _ to denote a generic configuration):
DL ` _ jmpIn?(R
′′)
=========⇒ c′′1 = c(0)1
α
(0)
1====⇒ · · · α
(n1−1)
1=======⇒ c(n1)1
jmpOut!(k
(n1)
1 ;R)============⇒ c(n1)+1 ξ···ξjmpIn?(R
′)
===========⇒∗ c′1
DL ` _ jmpIn?(R
′′)
=========⇒ c′′2 = c(0)2
α
(0)
2====⇒ · · · α
(n2−1)
2=======⇒ c(n2)2
jmpOut!(k
(n2)
2 ;R)============⇒ c(n2)+1 ξ···ξjmpIn?(R
′)
===========⇒∗ c′2
DH6 I ` _ jmpIn?(R
′′)
=========⇒ c′3 = c(0)3
α
(0)
3====⇒ · · · α
(n3−1)
3=======⇒ c(n3)3
jmpOut!(k
(n3)
3 ;R)============⇒ c(n3+1)3
DH6 I ` _ jmpIn?(R
′′)
=========⇒ c′4 = c(0)4
α
(0)
4====⇒ · · · α
(n4−1)
4=======⇒ c(n4)4
jmpOut!(k
(n4)
4 ;R)============⇒ c(n4+1)4 .
Thus, due to Property III.1 and by hypothesis, it holds that ∆t =
∑n1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) + (11 + MAX_TIME) · |Iα(0)1 ···α(n1)1 | =∑n2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ) + (11 + MAX_TIME) · |Iα(0)2 ···α(n2)2 |. Also, since by (IHP) and Properties III.20 and III.19 it follows that
c
(0)
1 = c
′′
1
U≈ c′′2 = c(0)2 , we know |Iα(0)1 ···α(n1)1 | = |Iα(0)2 ···α(n2)2 | (by Property III.18) and thus
∑n1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) =
∑n2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ).
Moreover, by (IHP) and Property III.11, we get c(0)1 = c
′′
1
P≈ c′3 = c(0)3 and c(0)2 = c′′2
P≈ c′4 = c(0)4 . Now, as a consequence of
Properties III.3, III.9 and III.8 we know that ∆t′ =
∑n3
i=0 γ(c
(i)
3 ) =
∑n1
i=0 γ(c
(i)
1 ) =
∑n2
i=0 γ(c
(i)
2 ) =
∑n3
i=0 γ(c
(i)
3 ) = ∆t
′′.
By (IHP) and since the first observable after c′3 and c
′
4 is the same, by Property III.20 it follows c
(n3+1)
3
U≈ c(n4+1)4 .
Thus, due to Property III.19, we get that the same coarse-grained observable jmpIn?(R′′′) is observed after c(n3+1)3 and
c
(n4+1)
4 . Finally, R′′′ is equal to R′ since after any jmpOut!(·; ·) a IN pc instruction is executed and its execution leads
to address A_JIN (by Algorithm 2) that performs jmpIn?(R), and the thesis follows.
Since we proved that
DH6 I ` INITCH6 I [MM ]
β
′
s===⇒ ∗ c3 and
DH6 I ` INITCH6 I [MM′ ]
β
′
s===⇒ ∗ c4
we also have that c3
U≈ c4 by Properties III.20 and III.19.
Let DH6 I ` c3 β3===⇒ ∗ c′′3 and DH6 I ` c4
β4===⇒ ∗ c′′4 , with β3 and β4 either empty or made of a single observable (either • or
jmpOut!(·; ·), since no difference cannot be observed upon jmpIn?(·) as observed above). By exhaustive cases on β and β′
we have:
• Case β = • and β′ = jmpOut!(∆t′′′;R′′). Note that, since term ⇐⇒ DL6 I ` c′1 →∗ HALT and c′1
P≈ c3 (by
Properties III.10 and III.11), we get term ⇐⇒ DH6 I ` c3 →∗ HALT by Property III.8 and since neither DL6 I nor DH6 I
raise any interrupt. Thus, by definition of DL (cf. Algorithm 2) the context CH distinguishes the two modules.
• Case β = jmpOut!(∆t′′′;R′′) and β′ = ε. Similar to the previous case (with term ′ in place of term).
• Case β = jmpOut!(∆t′′′;R′′) and β′ = jmpOut!(∆t′′′;R′′′) with R′′ 6= R′′′. Since c′1
P≈ c3 and c′2
P≈ c4, it must be that
β3 = jmpOut!(∆t
v;R′′) and β4 = jmpOut!(∆tvi;R′′). Thus, by Algorithms 1 and 2, CH distinguishes the two modules.
• Case β = jmpOut!(∆t′′′;R′′) and β′ = jmpOut!(∆tiv;R′′). In this case it holds that β3 = jmpOut!(∆tv;R′′) and
β4 = jmpOut!(∆t
vi;R′′) with the same timings of the instructions (by Property III.1). Since c3 U≈ c4, the two times must
differ one from each other otherwise, by the counterpositive of Property III.17, we would get MM T=MM ′ . Again, by
definition of Algorithms 1 and 2, one computation converges and one diverges, hence CH distinguishes the two modules.
Finally, we can use the above algorithms and results to prove that if two modules are contextually equivalent in SancusH,
then they are also contextually equivalent in SancusL.
Lemma III.8. If MM 'HMM ′ then MM 'LMM ′ .
Proof. We prove the contrapositive, i.e., if MM 6'L MM ′ then MM 6'H MM ′ . Since MM 6'L MM ′ , assume wlog that
CL[MM ]⇓L and CL[MM ′ ] 6⇓L. By Property III.21 we know that a pair of distinguishing traces for MM and MM ′ exist.
Algorithm 1 and 2 witness the existence of a context CH that – due to Properties III.22 and III.23 (with the right term and
term ′) – is an actual context and is guaranteed to differentiateMM fromMM ′ , i.e., CH [MM ]⇓H and CH [MM ′ ] 6⇓H (or vice
versa). Thus, by definition of contextually equivalent modules in SancusH, we get MM 6'HMM ′ as requested.
e) Full abstraction.: Finally, we can restate the original full abstraction theorem and prove it.
Theorem III.1 (Full abstraction). ∀MM ,MM ′ . (MM 'HMM ′ ⇐⇒ MM 'LMM ′).
Proof.
• Direction ⇒ follows from Lemma III.2.
• Direction ⇐ (i.e., (iii) in Figure 12), follows directly from Lemma III.8.
